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Executive Summary 
Context 
Merger activity has been a pervasive feature of the further education (FE) market for 
many years with 171 college mergers from 1993 to 2018, averaging roughly six per 
year. Merger activity has increased considerably in recent years following the Area 
Review (AR) process. There were 53 mergers in the three years since 2015, more than 
the number in the preceding decade (see figure below).  
Figure 1 FE College Mergers from 1993 to 2018 
 
Source: Frontier Economics, https://www.aoc.co.uk/about-colleges/college-mergers 
College mergers - particularly since 2010 - have happened in a challenging financial 
environment for the FE sector. According to the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)1 
funding per student aged 16-18 in FE fell by 8% in real terms between 2010 and 2018. 
Funding for adult education in FE was reduced by 45% over the same period. However, 
the number of adult learners fell by one million, such that spending per learner remained 
roughly constant in real terms. In addition to funding issues, a renewed policy focus 
towards apprenticeships and away from classroom based learning has created 
additional financial pressure for colleges since most apprenticeships have ended up 
being delivered by other provider types. This has meant that colleges have not received 
a large proportion of total funding for apprenticeships.  
                                            
 
1 https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/13307  
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Given the increased college merger activity in recent years, it is important to understand 
whether or not these have proved to be a successful route to improving college 
performance. The question is relevant to informing future government policy as to 
whether, and in which circumstances, mergers are an effective tool for driving 
improvements in the sector.  
This report examines how college mergers affect performance using an entirely 
quantitative approach. The focus is on financial performance with some analysis of 
quality as proxied by success rates. We have drawn on College Accounts from the 
Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA), which are a rich source of financial data. 
We have looked at a range of financial outcomes including operating profit, debt, 
interest payments and others. We have also measured changes in the quality of 
provision following mergers using success rates from the National Achievement Rates 
Tables.  
It is important to note that due to data availability, our work covers the period 2005 -
2015 which precedes the Area Review process. Our sample includes 40 college 
mergers which occurred predominantly in the South West, Midlands and North West as 
shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. A full list of mergers can be found in Annex A. 
Figure 2 Map of mergers from 2005 to 2015 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of Association of Colleges data. Mapping based on Local 
Education Authorities. 
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Figure 3 FE College Merger sample (2005-2015) 
 
Source: Frontier Economics, https://www.aoc.co.uk/about-colleges/college-mergers 
Approach 
In order to understand the impact of merging we need to compare the performance of 
merging colleges to those of suitable comparators. The key issue we face is that whilst 
we can observe the performance of merged colleges we do not know what would have 
happened to merging colleges had they not merged - the counterfactual. There are 
several options for constructing a counterfactual (illustrated in Figure 4): 
• Option 1: Compare merging colleges with non-merging colleges (dotted 
line in Figure 4). This approach provides a useful starting point and can provide 
robust findings if merging colleges are, on average, similar to non-merging 
colleges. However, if the colleges that merge are of a particular type (for 
example, those which have financial difficulties), comparing them with the wider 
sector may lead to flawed conclusions. For example, if two poorly performing 
colleges merge and following the merger their performance stabilises (albeit 
remaining relatively weak), comparing against the better-performing wider sector 
may wrongfully conclude that the merger has had a negative impact.  
• Option 2: Compare merging colleges with pre-merger trajectories (dashed 
line in Figure 4). This approach quantifies the pre-merger performance of 
merging colleges and uses their pre-merger trajectories to predict what would 
have happened to them in the absence of a merger. In practice, this involves 
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taking the average rate of change of the variable of interest across the relevant 
colleges2 and applying the same growth rate to the post-merger period. This is 
represented in Figure 4 as the merged entity line in dark blue before 2010 and 
the dashed line from 2010 onwards. The advantage of this approach is that it 
considers the circumstances of the merging colleges while the drawback is that it 
does not consider wider sectoral trends. 
• Option 3: Hybrid of options 1 and 2. A hybrid approach which accounts for the 
individual colleges’ historical trends as well as the wider sectoral trends provides 
a useful third approach for the counterfactual. This approach considers both the 
specific circumstances of the merging colleges as well as wider sectoral trends. 
Figure 4 Counterfactual options 
 
Source: Frontier Economics stylised example 
                                            
 
2 In the pre-merger period, we combine the variable of interest across the relevant colleges. This 
estimates what a merged entity would have looked like in the pre-merger period, had it merged then. For 
example, if college A has an income of £10,000 and college B has an income of £20,000 in the pre-
merger period, the hypothetical pre-merger entity would have an income of £30,000. 
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Given the difficulty in establishing a robust counterfactual and the advantages and 
disadvantages of the options set out above, we have experimented with all possible 
specifications and reported the results from all models.  
Findings 
We tested whether mergers have had a positive impact on several outcome variables 
relating to college performance. Table 1 illustrates the variables that were tested and 
what a hypothesised positive outcome might look like. 
Table 1 Outcome variables and hypothesised effect 
Outcome variable Hypothesis Hypothesised positive post-merger effect 
Profit Margin 
Cost reductions post-
merger drive increased 
profitability 
Increase 
Staff cost (as a % of 
income) 
Rationalisation of 
administrative staff leads 
to cost reductions 
Decrease 
Income per £ of fixed assets 
Rationalisation of fixed 
assets leads to cost 
reductions 
Increase 
Interest (as a % of income) Larger colleges able to refinance debt Decrease 
Debt (as a % of income) Larger colleges able to refinance debt Decrease 
Level 3 Success Rate 
Combined colleges able to 
deliver better quality 
learning post-merger due 
to financial improvements 
Increase 
Success Rate (across all 
levels) 
Combined colleges able to 
deliver better quality 
learning post-merger due 
to financial improvements 
Increase 
Source: Frontier Economics 
Our main finding (shown in Figure 5) is that there is no strong statistical evidence of 
college mergers leading to an improvement or deterioration of college performance on 
average. We find that, on average, the effect of merging is statistically indistinguishable 
from zero. Our methodology allows us to rule out the influence of individual college 
histories as well as the wider sectoral trend. This finding is robust to the different model 
specifications we have explored and applies to all financial and non-financial outcomes 
we have examined.  
13 
 
 
Figure 5 Summary of econometric results 
Outcome variable Estimated merger effect  Significant at 5% level? 
Profit Margin - 0.65% No 
Staff cost (as a % of 
income) + 0.10% No 
Income per £ of fixed assets + £0.01 No 
Interest (as a % of income) + 0.03% No 
Debt (as a % of income) + 2.54% No 
Level 3 Success Rate + 1.00% No 
All Success Rate - 0.67% No 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA and DfE data 
It is worth noting that although we find no effect on average, the performance of 
merging colleges varies a great deal. The average effects we find masks underlying 
variation where merging is positive for some colleges and negative for others. Indeed, 
some simple descriptive analysis of the data reveals that, following a merger, some 
colleges receive a boost in performance while others don’t.  
To explore this issue, we created an index of college performance based on three 
financial indicators (profitability, fixed cost synergies and debt refinancing) and ranked 
colleges based on their average performance in the three years before and after a 
merger. The results from this analysis show considerable variation in college 
performance post-merger although we find no clear differences in the characteristics 
(such as size, location and proximity of merging parties) of the best and worst 
performers – that is, it is difficult from this analysis to conclude what factors make 
mergers successful.   
Implications for future work 
Our work has drawn on the best available secondary data to examine the impact of 
mergers on college performance in the decade preceding the Area Review process. We 
find that, on average, merging does not lead to either an improvement or deterioration in 
performance. Exploratory work looking to unpick how the effect of merging varies by 
college reveals considerable variation in outcomes.  
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The data we used had some limitations which are worth noting: 
• We did not have access to detailed information on the rationale of different 
mergers and the anticipated benefits. As such, we were not able to distinguish 
between mergers which happened for commercial reasons and ‘rescue’ mergers. 
• We did not have data on any financial assistance (from Government) that 
merging parties may have accessed. Our understanding is that this type of 
assistance was uncommon but to the extent that it did occur, our data would not 
have captured it.    
Collection of data on the rationale for, and expected outcomes from, mergers as well as 
any financial assistance provided should be a priority going forward to enable future 
work in the area.  
The most obvious limitation of our work is that it does not cover mergers which 
happened as part of the Area Review (AR) process as data on these recent mergers 
was not yet available at the time the analysis was conducted. Given that the general 
environment facing the sector has changed so much in recent years and that the 
motivations for merging have also changed, it would be advisable to expand our work to 
cover at least the first wave of AR mergers. This could be done using quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Specifically, we recommend: 
• Descriptive quantitative analysis of ESFA College Accounts data to examine how 
financial performance of AR mergers changes post-merger; 
• Quantitative comparisons of AR merger outcomes against suitable comparators. 
The design of the AR process and availability of data from the Restructuring 
Facility enables several comparisons which were not possible in this study, such 
as colleges which were expected to merge at a later date or comparisons with 
recommended mergers which did not materialise; and 
• Deep dives into specific merger cases to understand in detail the factors which 
make mergers successful or unsuccessful. We envisage case studies involving 
interviews with relevant stakeholders as well as analysis of bespoke merger 
documentation and data (e.g. documents setting out the rationale for mergers, 
anticipated merger outcomes etc.). 
Together with our work, the new research would inform future government policy as to 
how and when mergers work well to improve performance and the circumstances when 
this is not the case. 
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Introduction  
Context for the study and specific research questions 
Merger activity has been a pervasive feature of the FE market for many years with 171 
college mergers since 1993, averaging roughly six per year. Historically this has tended 
to be driven by the failing financial health of the merging parties rather than any 
proactive efforts to improve performance from either a financial or provision perspective.  
However, the recent Area Review process has required colleges to consider their 
futures including explicit encouragement to consider mergers. There have been 39 
mergers across 2017 and 2018 alone with yet more on the cards.  
The Area Review process, which commenced in late 2015, coincided with significant 
funding reductions from austerity as well as the shift in policy focus towards 
apprenticeships and away from classroom based learning. This has created additional 
financial pressures for colleges. 
Considering this, our main question of interest for this report is whether or not mergers 
have proved to be a successful route to improving college performance. The question is 
relevant to informing future government policy as to whether, and in which 
circumstances, mergers are an effective tool for improving college performance. 
Whilst this analysis does not consider the mergers that occurred as part of the Area 
Review process, this may help inform the extent to which the recent wave of mergers 
from the Area Review process was different to those which occurred previously as well 
as whether further mergers might be desirable. It could also help to identify the types of 
mergers where additional support from DfE might prove necessary to achieve the 
ultimate objectives of improvements in college financial and learner performance. 
Finally, it helps improve the evidence base regarding what works in terms of mergers 
and spreads best practice regarding any future mergers. To our knowledge, this is the 
first large scale quantitative study of the effect of mergers in FE. As such, it should be 
seen as a first step which future research could build and improve on.  
Summary of approach taken 
Our approach to measuring the effect of FE college mergers relies on an entirely 
quantitative analysis of college-level outcomes, both financial and quality-related. 
Secondary data on financial performance reported by the Education and Skills Funding 
Agency was aggregated and analysed in order to measure the impact of mergers on 
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college-level financial performance. Data on learner success rates for all courses, as 
well as only level 3 type courses, from the National Achievement Rate Tables was used 
to measure the impact on college-level quality of provision.  
To be able to measure the impact of mergers, our approach compares post-merger 
performance with what performance would have been expected without the merger. 
This is challenging as merged college performance against measurable metrics may 
look no better than pre-merged college performance. However, this does not mean that 
there has not been an effect. The merger could have acted to reduce or restrict the 
decline that would have occurred in its absence. We discuss the different options for 
dealing with the issues around the counterfactual in the methodology section.  
The sample of mergers analysed includes all colleges which merged between 2005 and 
2015. Whilst data exists between 2004 and 2017, we have excluded mergers in 2004 
and 2017 due to the need of at least one year of data before and after a merger to 
evaluate impact.  
We have also excluded any mergers which occurred from 2016, given the 
commencement of the Area Review period where the policy environment differed 
substantially.  
Structure of the report 
The report is structured as follows: 
• Chapter 2 presents our methodology; 
• Chapter 3 details our findings; 
• Chapter 4 concludes. 
Additional detail containing a series of tables and figures showing the performance of 
merging colleges is contained in the Annex.  The Annex also contains a full set of 
econometric results. 
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Methodology  
Our methodology involved three steps described in Figure 6.  
Figure 6 Methodology overview 
 
Source: Frontier Economics 
First, we searched for relevant datasets and collated all available data for the analysis. 
Second, we used this data to produce descriptive statistics of merging college 
performance before and after they merged. Finally, we used multivariate econometric 
analysis to estimate the effect of merging on college performance, controlling for other 
relevant factors. We provide more detail on the methodological steps below.   
We combined financial performance data from the Education and Skills Funding Agency 
(ESFA)3 and college success rates data4 from the Department for Education (DfE) to 
create a panel dataset of college financial and non-financial performance between 2005 
and 2015. 
                                            
 
3 Most recent data can be found at the following link: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/esfa-financial-
management-college-accounts 
4 Most recent tables can be found at the following link: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/sfa-
national-success-rates-tables 
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Selecting key outcomes of interest 
Financial Outcomes 
We aggregated and analysed secondary data from college-level financial statements 
reported by the ESFA in order to analyse FE college financial outcomes from 20055 to 
20156.  
Given the large number of financial variables reported for each college in the financial 
statements (more than 350), we implemented a hypothesis based approach to select a 
subset of key financial outcomes to be analysed. Based on conversations with both DfE 
and ESFA staff, we focussed on the impacts of mergers on college costs as a way of 
driving college profitability post-merger.  
We also report other hypotheses which were not considered further, mainly those 
concerning drivers of college revenue. Given approximately 80% of college revenue is 
made up of funding body grants7, it is unlikely that merger synergies, such as exploiting 
increased size or economies of scope, can influence college revenue through grant 
funding. 
Figure 7 represents a summary of our hypothesis based approach. We identified 
several hypothesised drivers of college-level profitability, split into either college 
revenue or costs drivers. Several financial variables are reported below each driver, 
which measure the impact of a certain driver on college finances. A description of the 
channel through which each driver affects college-level profitability is also reported in 
the figure. 
College-level profitability was selected as a relevant outcome because it summarises 
the overall financial position of a college, considering both revenue and cost 
components contemporaneously. We use a college’s operating profit margin to measure 
any evidence of changes to profitability. 
Two additional cost-side drivers were included in the analysis to explore hypotheses 
around the drivers of any post-merger improvement in profitability: 
                                            
 
5 2005 refers to the year 2004/05 as reported in the ESFA financial accounts. 
6 Most variables reported in the financial statements were measured consistently over time. However, 
some variables were not reported in all years of our sample. These variables were dropped from our 
analysis. In particular, EBITDA margin was only reported in ESFA accounts from 2015 onwards and 
learner numbers were not reported before 2009. 
7 Calculated as a simple average across all colleges using 2016 ESFA financial accounts. 
19 
 
• Fixed cost synergies – we hypothesised that colleges which undergo a merger 
may be able to combine and rationalise fixed assets, such as buildings and 
administrative staff, in order to reduce cost. We use a college’s staff costs (as a 
% of income) and income per £ of fixed assets to measure any evidence of 
realised fixed cost synergies. 
• Debt refinancing – we hypothesised that colleges which undergo a merger may 
be able to use their combined balance sheet and potential synergies to 
renegotiate loans, reducing their debt burden. We use a college’s debt and 
interest (as a % of income) to measure any evidence of realised debt refinancing. 
Figure 7 Hypothesis tree for key financial outcome selection 
 
Source: Frontier Economics 
Non-Financial Outcomes 
The inclusion of non-financial outcomes was reflective of the educational mission of FE 
colleges. The main hypothesis we sought to test was whether mergers had any positive 
or negative impact on the quality of FE provision in a college. Data on learner success 
rates for all courses, as well as NVQ level 3 type courses alone, from the National 
Achievement Rate Tables, was used to measure the impact on college-level success 
rates.  
College-level success rates are an indirect proxy for college-level teaching quality as 
they measure the proportion of learners who have successfully completed their course. 
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Increases in the overall success rate may be driven by improved teaching and school 
quality but may also be driven by changes in course offerings at the college level as well 
as changes in college intake over time.  
To reduce the influence that changes in course make-up have on measuring college 
teaching quality, we include the success rate for only courses with NVQ Level 3 status. 
The success rate of a single, widely available, qualification is more consistent across 
college and across time. However, unlike the overall success rate, it only reflects a 
subset of teaching within a college. 
As shown in Figure 8, several variables measuring college quality were considered but 
rejected based on technical and conceptual feasibility grounds. A college’s OFSTED 
rating was considered as providing a balanced view of college quality. However, there 
are conceptual issues around the length of time between inspections as well as 
technical issues regarding the difficulty in quantifying and combining ratings across 
colleges in the pre-merger period. We concluded that combining ratings to create a pre-
merger average OFSTED rating, a fundamental step to conducting our methodology, 
was not feasible. For these reasons, it was agreed that OFSTED ratings should not be 
included as an outcome in our analysis. 
Variables related to the number of learners as well as learner satisfaction were 
excluded based on their technical feasibility. The short length of the time period 
available for the data, dating only from 2010 onwards, implied that the sample size 
would be too small to provide statistically reliable results. 
Figure 8 Technical and Conceptual feasibility of non-financial variables 
 
Source: Frontier Economics 
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Final list of Outcomes 
The final list of key outcomes selected for analysis is reported in Table 2. 
Table 2 Key outcome variables 
Variable Outcome category 
Description and 
hypothesis 
Source 
Operating Profit (as a 
% of income) 
Financial Measures overall 
financial position 
ESFA College 
Accounts 
Staff costs (as a % of 
income) 
Financial Measures whether 
any fixed cost 
synergies occur 
post-merger 
ESFA College 
Accounts 
Income per £ of fixed 
asset 
Financial Measures whether 
any fixed cost 
synergies occur 
post-merger 
ESFA College 
Accounts 
Debt payments (as a 
% of income) 
Financial Measures whether 
any synergies 
occur to refinance 
debt post-merger 
ESFA College 
Accounts 
Interest payments (as 
a % of income) 
Financial Measures whether 
any synergies 
occur to refinance 
debt post-merger 
ESFA College 
Accounts 
Overall college 
success rate 
Non-financial 
(quality) 
Measures whether 
mergers impact 
learner success 
rate 
National 
Achievement Rate 
Tables 
Success rate – NVQ 
Level 3+ courses 
Non-financial 
(quality) 
Measures whether 
mergers impact 
learner success 
rate 
National 
Achievement Rate 
Tables 
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Source: Frontier Economics 
Sample of mergers analysed 
The sample of mergers analysed includes all colleges which merged between 2005 and 
2015. Whilst data exists between 2004 and 2017, we have excluded mergers in 2004 
and 2017 due to the need of at least one year of data before and after a merger to 
evaluate its impacts. We have also excluded any mergers which occurred during the 
Area Review period from 2016, given the differences in policy environment during the 
Review period. 
The sample includes forty (40) mergers, which occur in several regions. A complete list 
of all mergers included in the sample is reported in Annex A. Heat maps showing the 
location of mergers is shown in Figure 29 in Annex B. 
Constructing pre-merger college outcomes 
We used data reported by the Association of Colleges (AoC) to identify the colleges 
which underwent a merger. The AoC database contains a full list of all merger activity in 
England since 1993 and provides the names of merging parties and the dates of the 
mergers. A matching exercise was undertaken between college names and college 
UKPRN codes to match merged colleges with financial and success rate data. 
For each merged college, we created a pre-merger history, aggregating the outcomes 
from the relevant colleges in the pre-merger period. We create a yearly time series for 
all years before a merger, which we can compare with the post-merger data on a like-
for-like basis. This allows us to compare a merged college’s performance with the 
aggregate performance across the various colleges before they merged.  
Table 3 uses the merger between City of Bath College and North Radstock College in 
2014-15 to create Bath College as an example of the aggregation process pre-merger. 
For certain outcomes, we can combine outcome variables together, such as college 
income. We simply add the income data of City of Bath and North Radstock colleges 
together to obtain a pre-merger value for Bath College in 2013-14, as shown below. 
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Table 3 Example of pre-merger history for Bath College (total income) 
Year Bath College (merged entity) 
City of Bath 
College 
North Radstock 
College 
2013-14  24,144,000 
(estimated)  
16,839,000  7,305,000  
2014-15  19,489,000 N/A  N/A  
2015-16  22,291,000  N/A  N/A  
2016-17  19,841,510  N/A  N/A  
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of AoC and ESFA data 
Table 4 illustrates pre-merger aggregation with outcomes reported in percentages such 
as debt as a % of income. In order to calculate the pre-merger outcome, we must take a 
weighted average. Specifically, we must first derive total debt across both colleges and 
then divide total debt by combined income.8 
Table 4 Example of pre-merger history for Bath College (debt as a % of income) 
Year Bath College (merged entity) 
City of Bath 
College 
North Radstock 
College 
2013-14  25.12% 
(estimated)  
18.09%  41.08%  
2014-15  29.61%  N/A  N/A  
2015-16  26.8%  N/A  N/A  
2016-17  19.92%  N/A  N/A  
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of AoC and ESFA data 
                                            
 
8 Mathematically, total debt for both colleges is written as  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
=  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶+𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶+𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶
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Descriptive analysis 
We conducted a descriptive analysis to explore key trends in the financial and success 
rate outcome variables. We also use this analysis to help inform more detailed statistical 
methods to estimate the effect of college mergers and to help interpret results 
considering recent policy developments in the FE sector. 
FE sector trends 
We firstly analysed trends in the key outcome variables in our analysis, as reported in 
Table 2. We were able to quantify average sector trends9 for FE colleges and unpick 
key drivers of overall FE sector financial health and quality. 
Comparing merged colleges with non-merged colleges and over time 
We then compared the performance of colleges which underwent a merger to those 
which did not. The average difference reflects whether the performance across the 
sample of colleges which merged was different from performance across the wider 
sector. We also compared the average outcomes of colleges before and after a merger 
as an alternative way of summarising the impact of mergers. 
Comparing performance of merged and non-merged colleges over time is one way of 
evaluating the effects of mergers. However, any differences in performance might be 
driven by differences between the type of college which decides to undergo a merger. 
This analysis helps inform whether or not the wider sector is a helpful comparison group 
or counterfactual for colleges which undergo a merger. We discuss the different 
counterfactual options considered in the study in the next section.  
Econometric analysis 
One of the objectives of our econometric analysis is to find a suitable counterfactual 
against which the performance of merged colleges can be compared in order to 
estimate the effect of mergers. Another is to be able to test whether any impact 
identified from mergers is statistically different from zero. Finally, econometrics allows 
us to control for a range of other factors which may affect college performance but are 
unrelated to merging.  
                                            
 
9 There are a small number of colleges which don’t report their financial performance in the ESFA data. 
Thus, the average performance measured may not be fully reflective of the sector. 
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Economic theory suggests several possible suitable counterfactuals, which we 
considered when deciding on a certain methodology (see box overleaf). 
 
Theoretical approaches to identifying counterfactual outcomes 
Controlling for all other relevant factors 
This approach includes and controls for all relevant factors which may affect college 
performance, in order to isolate the effect of a merger on college outcomes. By 
stripping out the effect of all relevant factors, the colleges which do not undergo a 
merger can be compared with merged colleges, acting as a counterfactual. Practical 
issues lie in both identifying and collecting data on all relevant outcomes which 
determine college performance. 
Difference-in-Differences 
This approach compares the difference in outcomes across two groups: for colleges 
before and after a merger as compared to a group of colleges which did not undergo 
a merger over the same time period. Assuming the trends of the two groups were 
similar in the pre-merger period, the non-merged groups acts as a counterfactual to 
the group of colleges which underwent a merger. Practical issues lie in whether an 
appropriate counterfactual group of colleges which did not merge can be identified. 
Matching on observables 
This approach builds on the difference-in-differences approach by selecting colleges 
which look similar to those which merged based on a set of key characteristics. One 
can construct a counterfactual group which has many key common characteristics. 
Practical issues revolve around whether the set of characteristics are indeed relevant 
as well as the extent to which these comparator colleges exist. 
Quasi-experimental methods 
These approaches rely on certain mechanical determinants of a merger, for example 
a specific financial health cut-off, or factors which can be exploited to define a 
counterfactual. For example, if a merger were to only occur below a certain financial 
health score cut-off, colleges which had a financial health score just above the 
determined cut-off would be comparable to colleges which were slightly below the cut-
off. Practical issues revolve around identifying whether any mechanisms exist which 
would allow for these methods. 
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Finding a suitable counterfactual for merging colleges in our dataset is a challenging 
task. It is not clear if the overall FE sector is a good comparator since colleges that 
merge could disproportionately be those that are in financial difficulty. Thus, comparing 
the post-merger performance of merged colleges against colleges in the wider sector 
that did not merge may lead to a biased measurement of the merger effect. 
It is also not sufficient to compare the performance of colleges before and after they 
merged. This is because even in the absence of a merger, colleges may have 
experienced year-on-year changes in performance in line with the fluctuations observed 
across the sector due to factors that affect all colleges in a similar way. One approach 
may be to control for a range of relevant college- and time-specific characteristics, in 
effect stripping out their effect. However, given the small sample of mergers available, 
we are unable to include a wide range of college characteristics. 
Our econometric analysis is based on the difference-in-differences framework outlined 
above. The main analysis uses the sector average as the counterfactual while also 
controlling for any college-specific and wider sector trends. This allows us to estimate 
the effect of college mergers accounting for any changes to the wider sector which may 
have influenced the performance of colleges.  
The following section provides further details on the three different econometric models 
we have considered in our analysis. The three econometric models are: 
1. Controlling only for college-specific trends; 
2. Controlling only for wider sector trends; and 
3. Controlling for both college-specific and wider sector trends.  
Note that in all charts below, the solid red line represents the actual observed outcomes 
while the dashed lines represent the counterfactual (or estimated) outcomes. The blue 
shaded area represents the estimated impact of the merger between year T and year 
T+3. 
1. Controls for college-specific trends: In the absence of a merger, we 
hypothesise that a college would have continued its trajectory in the pre-merger 
period.  
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Figure 9 Example of controlling for college specific trends
 
A “fixed effects” econometric model allows us to construct a predicted outcome in 
the hypothetical scenario of colleges not merging. This model controls for fixed 
factors for each individual college. Comparing the predicted outcome to the 
actual outcome allows us to estimate the merger effect relative to the pre-merger 
college trend. 
2. Controls for average sector performance post-merger: In the absence of a 
merger, we hypothesise that a college would have experienced year-on-year 
growth rates similar to the sector. 
Figure 10 Example of controlling for overall sector performance 
 
By including categorical variables for each year in our model, we can estimate 
the average sector outcomes in the post-merger period. The dashed yellow line 
represents what we would anticipate would have happened to performance, in 
line with wider sector trends. The shaded blue area represents the uptick in 
college performance, relative to what we estimate would have happened to the 
college in the absence of a merger, in line with the average sector uptick from 
years T to T+3. 
3. Controlling for college-specific trends and average sector performance 
post-merger: By combining the approaches discussed in (1) and (2), we 
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estimate the merger effect controlling for both college-specific and sector-wide 
trends. The regression method we employ provides a simple way to include both 
controls. 
Figure 11 Example of controlling for overall sector performance and college 
specific trends 
 
The difference-in-differences model that we estimate isolates sector-wide changes 
(identified in Figure 10) that may have happened from any college level changes 
(identified in Figure 9) and allows us to quantify the merger effect (highlighted in Figure 
11). 
We considered several different versions of the econometric specification to enable a 
comprehensive understanding of merger effects on different financial (e.g. profitability, 
staff costs, debt etc.) and non-financial variables (e.g. success rates). These are 
described in the Annex C.  
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Findings 
Descriptive analysis findings 
FE sector trends 
Overall, FE colleges have experienced a general decline in financial performance since 
2005, whilst experiencing an increase in the average student success rate (see Table 
5). Specifically, between 2005 and 2015: 
 The average FE college operating profit margin decreased from 1.3% to 0%. This may 
be driven by declining funding per pupil given to FE colleges since 201010 given that 
most college income (83% on average) originates from funding body grants11. 
 The current ratio of colleges12 has also fallen over time, although the largest drop in 
current ratio occurred between 2015 and 2017 as shown in 
  
 Figure 23 in the Annex. 
 Debt payments as a percentage of yearly income have increased by almost 16 
percentage points, from 8.3% to 24.1%. Furthermore, interest payments as a 
percentage of income have increased from 0.4% to 1% of income during the same 
period. 
 Staff costs have decreased by 1.3 percentage points. Whereas staff costs were equal 
to around 67% of college income in 2005, staff costs were on average 66% of college 
income in 2015. 
 Student success rates have gone up by 11.5 percentage points, bringing the average 
success rate across all courses to 83%. This increase has been largely driven by Level 
3 courses, which have seen an increase in success rate of 15 percentage points. 
  
                                            
 
10 2018 Annual Report on Education Spending in England – Institute of Fiscal Studies 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/comms/R150.pdf 
11 Number calculated using ESFA College Accounts data from 2005 to 2015. 
12 Current ratio is defined as Current Assets of a college divided by its Current Liabilities. 
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Table 5 Average FE college performance between 2005 and 2015 
Year 
Operating 
Surplus 
(as a % of 
income) 
Staff 
costs 
(as a % 
of 
income) 
Current 
Ratio 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt 
as a % 
of 
income 
Success 
Rate 
(Level 3) 
Success 
Rate (All 
Courses) 
2005 1.3% 66.8% 1.89 0.4% 8.3% 69.1% 71.6% 
2015 0.0% 65.5% 1.86 1.0% 24.1% 84.2% 83.1% 
Change 
2005 to 
2015 
-1.3 
percentage 
points 
(p.p.) 
-1.3 p.p. -0.04 0.6 p.p. 15.7 p.p. 15.0 p.p. 11.5 p.p. 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA and National Success Rate Tables 
Comparing merged colleges with non-merged ones 
On average, colleges which have undergone a merger are more than two times larger 
than the sector average in terms of their income. These colleges are more likely to face 
financial difficulties as evidenced by lower profit margins and higher debt burdens as 
well as lower success rates, as shown in Table 6 and Table 7. The averages reported 
below are calculated between 2005 and 2015 and include both the period before and 
after a merger for colleges which underwent a merger.  
Table 6 Average financial outcomes for merged and non-merged colleges  
College Income (thousands) 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Current 
Ratio 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt as 
a % of 
income 
Non-
Merged £16,631 1.40% 66.3% 1.92 0.75% 16.93% 
Merged £43,993 -0.40% 64.6% 1.38 0.87% 20.31% 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
Table 7 Average non-financial outcomes for merged and non-merged colleges  
College Success Rate (Level 3) Success Rate (All Courses) 
Non-Merged 81% 81% 
Merged 76% 79% 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of National Success Rate Tables 
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Comparing colleges pre- and post-merger 
Figure 12 and Figure 13 report the average performance pre- and post-merger for 
financial and success rate outcomes for colleges which underwent a merger in our 
sample. On average, colleges experience decreases in profit margins as a percentage 
of their income in the period after a merger as compared to the period before. 
Furthermore, interest and debt as a percentage of income are, on average, higher post-
merger than pre-merger. Finally, success rates are, on average, higher in the post-
merger period. 
Figure 12 Average financial outcomes for merged colleges 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
Figure 13 Average non-financial outcomes for merged colleges 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of National Success Rate Tables 
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Whilst Figure 13 and Figure 14 describe the change in performance of colleges after a 
merger, this analysis is unable to disentangle the effect of wider sector trends in 
influencing post-merger performance. For example, whilst merged colleges appear to 
exhibit higher success rates post-merger, it is unclear whether the merger, rather than 
the wider FE sector trend, have contributed to the increases in success rates. By 
comparing the pre- and post-merger performance with comparable colleges, we can 
determine whether certain changes were observed in the broader FE sector. 
Comparing merged colleges both pre- and post-merger and against 
sector average 
Figure 14 compares the average performance of FE colleges in the six years before and 
after a merger with the wider sector. Whilst a comparison of average performance pre- 
and post-merger confirms the finding that merged colleges have lower profit margins 
after a merger, colleges which undergo a merger experience average profits which are 
markedly lower than the sector average over the six years pre- and post-merger. This 
implies that colleges which underwent mergers are not likely comparable to the sector 
when considering profitability, given their differences in profit. 
Figure 14 Average profit margin of merged colleges compared to sector average 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
Figure 15 plots the distribution of profit margins for colleges which underwent a merger 
compared to the sector average and at different points in time. Overall, the chart shows 
that the decline in the average profit margin reported in Figure 14 masks a significant 
dispersion in profit margin changes compared to the sector average across colleges. 
Whilst the average profit margin for merged colleges is 1.3 percentage points lower than 
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the sector average 4 years after a merger, this varies widely, ranging between 15 
percentage points lower and 12 percentage points higher. 
Figure 15 Distribution of profit margin for merged colleges compared to sector 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
Figure 16 compares debt as a percentage of income six years before and after a 
merger with the wider sector. In this case, colleges which undergo a merger appear to 
have similar trends in their relative debt as compared to the sector. In subsequent years 
following a merger, there is evidence to suggest that the average amount of relative 
debt for merged colleges grows at a faster rate than the sector average. 
Figure 16 Average debt as a % of income for merged colleges compared to sector 
average 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
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Figure 17 highlights success rates for merged colleges compared with the sector 
average. Success rates have been increasing over time for merged colleges, but they 
have followed the overall sector trend. The percentage point difference between NVQ 
Level 3 success rates has been stable over time and has increase slightly for all 
courses in the sample period. 
Figure 17 Comparison between success rates of merged and non-merged 
colleges 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of National Success Rate Tables 
It is worth noting that the descriptive analysis presented in this chapter is not able 
to quantify whether differences between colleges and across time are statistically 
different from each other. For example, a descriptive analysis is unable to determine 
whether the relative decline in profitability or uplift in relative debt for merged colleges is 
sufficiently large to be considered different. Using Figure 15 as an example, there is a 
large variation in profitability post-merger with merged colleges having profit margins 
between 10% higher and 15% lower than average. Given the degree of variation in the 
data, the average observed decrease in profit margin is unlikely to be representative of 
most colleges which undergo a merger. 
We turn to econometric analysis in the next section of the report, which accounts for 
both general sector trends as well as the amount of variation across colleges within a 
certain variable when estimating the impact of mergers on FE colleges.  
Econometric findings 
This section presents the results of econometric analysis of the impact of mergers on 
college financial and non-financial outcomes. Overall, our results suggest that there is 
no statistically significant relationship (positive or negative) between merging and 
financial and non-financial outcomes. We do, however, see considerable variation in 
outcomes for different colleges – in some cases outcomes improve markedly while in 
others a merger is followed by a deterioration in performance. It is not clear whether 
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factors such as college size, location and proximity of merging parties can explain why 
some mergers work out better than others. 
Financial Outcomes 
As described previously, we estimated a baseline econometric specification on five 
different financial metrics: profitability, staff costs as a percentage of income, income 
per pound of fixed assets, interest payments as a percentage of income and debt as a 
percentage of income. For each financial metric, we estimated the impact of mergers on 
financial outcomes compared to the sector average, controlling for college and year 
fixed factors.  The table below summarises the results of these econometric tests:  
Table 8 Econometric results from baseline model (financial outcomes) 
Financial variable 
Estimated 
merger effect 
- on levels 
Significant at 
10% level? - 
Levels 
regression 
Estimated 
merger effect 
- on YoY 
growth 
Significant at 
10% level? - 
YoY growth 
regression 
Profit Margin - 0.65% No - 0.29 p.p. No 
Staff cost (as a % of 
income) - 0.10% No - 0.31 p.p. No 
Income per £ of 
fixed assets + £0.01 No - £0.06 No 
Interest (as a % of 
income) + 0.03% No + 0.06 p.p. No 
Debt (as a % of 
income) + 2.54% No - 0.47 p.p. No 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
As indicated by the columns on statistical significance in the table above, none of the 
financial outcomes changed by a statistically significant amount following a merger. The 
effect of college mergers on financial performance, in other words, was statistically 
indistinguishable from zero at the 10% level (and, by implication, at the more widely 
used 5% level).  
In Table 9, we show the results from an alternative model specification. In this 
specification, based on a sample of colleges which merged, we estimate the effects of a 
merger on the outcome variables for specific years before and after the merger. This 
allows us to test whether, for example, colleges which experienced declining 
performance pre-merger performed differently to other colleges post-merger.  
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This alternative model differs from the one described previously, as it seeks to test for 
the presence of any effect on college performance in the years before and after a 
merger. Instead of testing average performance in the post-merger period, as compared 
to average performance in the pre-merger period, our alternative model tests the 
merger effect on a year-by year basis. The average yearly outcome in the three years 
before and after a merger is compared to college outcomes outside of that period. 
There is little evidence of significant pre- or post-merger effects on financial variables up 
to 3 years before/after for merged colleges, as summarised in the table below, as 
compared to performance outside of the 3 years before/after a merger.  
The only exception is some evidence that, compared to the period more than 3 years 
before and after a merger, college profit margins were 1 percentage point lower two 
years before a merger. This is consistent with our hypothesis that colleges tend to 
undergo mergers when in positions of financial distress. 
Table 9 Econometric results from alternative model (financial outcomes) 
Time 
before/after 
merger 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff cost 
(as a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ of 
fixed 
assets 
Interest (as 
a % of 
income) 
Debt (as a 
% of 
income) 
T - 3 - 0.40% - 0.20% + £0.06 - 0.10% + 0.00% 
T - 2 - 1.1%** + 0.20% - £0.03 - 0.10% - 1.00% 
T - 1 - 0.60% + 0.20% - £0.03 - 0.2%* + 0.00% 
T (merger year) - 0.30% - 0.50% - £0.05 - 0.20% + 2.00% 
T + 1 - 0.60% - 0.10% + £0.01 - 0.20% - 2.00% 
T + 2 + 0.40% + 0.60% + £0.00 - 0.3%* - 4.00% 
T + 3 + 0.10% + 0.90% - £0.02 - 0.20% - 1.00% 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
Note: *indicates significant at 10% level, **indicates significant at 5% level and ***indicates 
significant at 1% level 
Several factors can lead to the lack of statistical significance: 
1. A relatively small number of mergers are analysed – the current dataset contains 
information on 40 mergers. In general, studies with small sample sizes are less 
likely to be able to identify significant effects.  
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2. There will be mergers occurring for different reasons, for example strategic and 
rescue mergers. We lack data on the rationale for mergers, as well as other data 
such as financial support, and are therefore unable to control for these. 
3. Large variations in post-merger performance exist – there are large differences in 
post-merger performance amongst merged colleges. As shown in Figure 15, 
some colleges experience large increases in performance whilst others 
experience large declines. This increases the potential range of observed post-
merger effects, implying both positive and negative effects are possible. 
Overall the econometric analysis is not able to provide conclusive evidence of positive 
or negative results of mergers on colleges’ financial performance. The Annex provides 
details of other specifications we tested for robustness checks – the results of those 
specifications are consistent with our results.  
Non-financial Outcomes 
We have run our baseline econometric specification on two different non-financial 
metrics: success rates for Level 3 courses only and success rates for all courses 
according to the methodology specified above. The table below summarises the results: 
Table 10 Econometric results from baseline model (non-financial outcomes) 
Non-financial 
variable 
Estimated 
merger effect 
- on levels 
Significant at 
10% level? - 
Levels 
regression 
Estimated 
merger effect 
- on YoY 
growth 
Significant at 
10% level? - 
YoY growth 
regression 
Level 3 Success 
Rate 1.00% No -1.15 p.p. Yes 
All Success Rate -0.67% No 0.05 p.p. No 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of National Success Rate Tables 
The results indicate that mergers have: 
• No statistically significant effect on the level of success rates on average (either 
on Level 3 success rates or on all success rates); 
• No statistically significant effect on the growth rates of all success rates on 
average; and 
• A small, negative but significant impact on the average growth rates of Level 3 
success rates – that, is we find that merging is associated with a slower growth 
rate in Level 3 success rates as compared to colleges which do not undergo a 
merger.  
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A subsequent analysis of merger impacts in the 3 years before and after a merger, as is 
described above, explores the estimated decline in the growth rate of level 3 success 
rates further. 
Table 11 Econometric results from alternative model (non-financial outcomes) 
Time 
before/after 
merger 
Percentage point (p.p.) change - 
Level 3 Success Rate 
Percentage point (p.p.) change 
-    All Success Rate 
T - 3 1 p.p.* -0.7 p.p. 
T - 2 -1.1 p.p. -0.9 p.p. 
T - 1 1 p.p. 0.7 p.p. 
T (merger year) -1.4 p.p. 0.2 p.p. 
T + 1 0.2 p.p. -0.7 p.p. 
T + 2 1.9 p.p. 0.6 p.p. 
T + 3 -1.7 p.p.* -0.8 p.p. 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of National Success Rate Tables 
Note: *indicates significant at 10% level, **indicates significant at 5% level and ***indicates 
significant at 1% level 
While the finding of a significant effect on the growth rate of Level 3 success rates 
seems noteworthy, further inspection suggests that this result is driven by: 
• A temporary drop in Level 3 success rates (depicted in Figure 18 below) of 
merged colleges in the merger year compared to the wider sector, and; 
• A sharp reduction in the average Level 3 success rate 3 years after a merger. 
Figure 18 highlights the variance in the outcome, which may explain why the finding is 
not significant at the conventional 5% level of significance. 
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Figure 18 Success rates pre- and post-merger compared to sector average 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of National Success Rate Tables 
Comparison of characteristics across merged colleges 
Given our work suggests that the average effect of mergers is indistinguishable from 
zero, we analyse variation in individual level college performance. A composite score for 
each college, based on college profitability, fixed cost synergies and debt burden, is 
created to summarise and rank post-merger performance. This composite rank provides 
a balanced view of relative financial performance across the 3 key metrics. It is also 
used to identify colleges which have under/outperformed their peer group and test 
whether certain college characteristics differ by post-merger performance.  
We have used the composite rank of post-merger performance and analysed how it 
correlates with the following college characteristics: 
• Relative size of colleges undergoing a merger; 
• Rurality of college location; 
• Region of merger, and; 
• Pre-merger trends in performance. 
We use the average change in three college financial outcomes (profitability, fixed cost 
synergies and debt burden) comparing the three years before with the three years after 
a merger. For each college and across the three financial metrics, we measure the 
average change in performance and rank colleges relative to all other mergers in the 
sample.  
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The combination of the three metrics provides a balanced view of financial performance. 
Ranking colleges by one metric only, such as profitability, excludes all the other 
concurrently important financial performance metrics. We report the individual college 
metric rankings in the Appendix and highlight how some colleges may be performing 
relatively well in one metric whilst performing less well in another. 
The ranking is sensitive to the time period considered, the financial metric chosen and 
the methodology used to calculate composite ranking. Given this limitation, it should be 
interpreted with due caution.  
The results from this analysis (shown in Figure 19) show considerable variation in 
college performance post-merger. For example, the best performing merger across all 
three metrics is South Essex College of Further and Higher Education where the profit 
margin increased by 8%, staff costs reduced by 6% and the level of debt as a proportion 
of income fell by 5% compared to the three years pre-merger. At the other end of the 
spectrum is K College where profits fell considerably, and staff costs and debt increased 
significantly.  
On the whole, we find no clear differences in the characteristics (such as size, location 
and proximity of merging parties) of the top and bottom performers – that is, it is difficult 
from this analysis to conclude what factors make mergers more or less successful. 
Additional analysis describing how the college ranking varies by college characteristics 
can be found in the Annex.   
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 Figure 19 Variation in college performance post-merger – top 5 and bottom 5 
performing colleges 
College Name 
Ranking 
based on 
composite   
score 
Change in Profit 
Margin (3 years 
after vs 3 years 
before) 
Change in Staff 
costs (as a % of 
income) (3 
years aft…) 
Change in 
debt (as a % 
of income) (3 
years aft…) 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 1 8% -6% -5% 
Salford City 
College 2 4% -4% -4% 
The College of 
Haringey, 
Enfield and 
North East 
London 3 2% -10% -2% 
South 
Nottingham 
College 4 2% -5% -3% 
Sparsholt 
College 5 -1% -7% -3% 
… … … … … 
Stockport 
College 36 -3% 6% 16% 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 37 -4% 7% 12% 
Kirklees College 38 -14% 5% 32% 
Sutton Coldfield 
College 39 -12% 9% 16% 
K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 40 -25% 8% 58% 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA data 
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Conclusions  
This report examines how college mergers affect performance using an entirely 
quantitative approach and focusing on financial performance. We have drawn on 
College Accounts data from the ESFA and have looked at a range of outcomes 
including operating profit, debt, interest payments and others. We have also checked 
whether the quality of provision changes following mergers using success rates from the 
National Achievement Rate Tables. It is important to note that due to data availability, 
our work covers the period 2005 - 2015 which precedes the Area Review process.  
We have used descriptive and econometric analysis and have experimented with 
several different counterfactuals: 
• Comparing merging colleges with non-merging colleges; 
• Comparing merging colleges before and after a merger; and 
• Comparing merging colleges before and after a merger but also accounting for 
wider sectoral trends. 
We find no strong statistical evidence of college mergers leading to an improvement or 
deterioration of college performance on average. That is, we find that on average the 
effect of merging is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This finding is robust to the 
different model specifications we have explored and applies to all financial and non-
financial outcomes we have examined.  
We also find that while the average effect of merging is not significantly different from 
zero, the performance of merging colleges varies a great deal. For some colleges, a 
merger is followed by significant improvement in observed performance while for others 
this is not the case. Using secondary data alone, however, it is not clear what factors 
may drive the difference in performance. We have looked at several characteristics 
(such as size, location and proximity of merging parties) of the top and bottom 
performers and have found no obvious patterns. 
It is worth noting that our work was based on data which had limitations: 
• We did not have access to detailed information on the rationale for different 
mergers and the anticipated benefits. As such we were not able to distinguish 
between mergers which happened for commercial reasons and ‘rescue’ mergers. 
 
• We did not have data on any financial assistance (from Government) that merging 
parties may have accessed. Our understanding is that this type of assistance was 
uncommon but to the extent that it did occur, our data would not have captured it.    
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Collection of data on the rationale for, and expected outcomes from, mergers as well as 
any financial assistance provided should be a priority going forward to enable future 
work in the area.  
The other obvious limitation of our work is that it does not cover mergers which 
happened as part of the Area Review process as data on these recent mergers was not 
yet available at the time the analysis was conducted. Given that the general 
environment facing the sector has changed so much in recent years and that the 
motivations for merging have also changed, it would be advisable to expand our work to 
cover at least the first wave of Area Review mergers. This could be done using 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Specifically, we recommend: 
• Descriptive quantitative analysis of ESFA College Accounts data to examine how 
financial performance of college mergers in the AR period changes post-merger; 
• Quantitative comparisons of AR merger outcomes against suitable comparators. 
The design of the AR process and availability of data from the Restructuring 
Facility enables several comparisons which were not possible in this study such 
as colleges which were expected to merge at a later date or comparisons with 
recommended mergers which didn’t materialise; and 
• Deep dives into specific merger cases to understand in detail the factors which 
make mergers successful or unsuccessful. We envisage case studies involving 
interviews with relevant stakeholders as well as analysis of bespoke merger 
documentation and data (e.g. documents setting out the rationale for mergers, 
anticipated merger outcomes etc.). 
Together with our work, the new research would inform future Government policy as to 
how and when mergers work well to improve performance and the circumstances when 
this is not the case. 
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ANNEX A MERGING COLLEGES DATA 
In the following section we report the colleges in the sample of mergers occurring 
between 2005 and 2015. The college names are the names of the most recent college 
entity. Information on the individual colleges which have merged to create the colleges 
below can be found on the Association of Colleges website13. 
College Name Merger Year 
Central Sussex College 2005 
Tyne Metropolitan College 2005 
College of West Anglia 2006 
Riverside College Halton 2006 
Stockport College 2006 
Brooklands College 2007 
Guildford College 2007 
Lincoln College 2007 
Sparsholt College 2007 
Trafford College 2007 
Kirklees College 2008 
Manchester College 2008 
Petroc 2008 
Stockton Riverside College 2008 
Truro and Penwith College 2008 
Wiltshire College 2008 
Salford City College 2009 
South Staffordshire College 2009 
South Thames College 2009 
The College of Haringey, Enfield and North East London 2009 
Colchester Institute 2010 
Derby College 2010 
Grimsby Institute of Further and Higher Education 2010 
K College (South and West Kent College) 2010 
South Essex College of Further and Higher Education 2010 
Barnet and Southgate College 2011 
Bromley College of Further and Higher Education 2011 
Gloucestershire College 2011 
Leeds City College 2011 
South Nottingham College 2011 
                                            
 
13 https://www.aoc.co.uk/about-colleges/college-mergers 
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Easton and Otley College 2012 
LeSoCo 2012 
South Gloucestershire and Stroud College 2012 
South and City College Birmingham 2012 
Herefordshire and Ludlow College 2013 
Sutton Coldfield College 2013 
Heart of Worcestershire College 2014 
Newcastle College 2014 
Bath College 2015 
Cornwall College Group 2015 
Source: Association of Colleges 
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ANNEX B SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The maximum period included was 2004 to 2017 however, for certain variables, the 
data only allowed a reporting of averages for a subset of this period. The charts show 
the average performance, of all FE colleges (including those that did not merge) in 
England. 
 Figure 20 Average Operating Profit Margin (2004-2017) 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
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Figure 21 Average Staff costs (as a % of income) (2004-2017) 
 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
Figure 22 Average Income per £ of fixed asset (2006-2017) 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
 
 
48 
 
Figure 23 Average Current Ratio (2004-2017) 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
Figure 24 Average interest payments (as a % of income) (2005-2017) 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
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Figure 25 Average total debt (as a % of income) (2005-2017) 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
Figure 26 Average college income (£’000s) (2004-2017) 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
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Figure 27 Average success rate for Level 3 courses (2005-2015) 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of National Achievement tables 
Figure 28 Average success rate for all courses (2005-2015) 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of National Achievement tables 
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Comparison of sample to post sample period 
The sample used in our analysis runs from 2005 to 2015. Starting from late 2015, the 
Area Review process was initiated, which changed the policy environment for mergers 
in the FE sector. We report the comparison of mergers in our sample with mergers that 
occurred in 2016 and 2017, the last year of our data collection. This allows us to 
address issues of external validity of findings and highlight relevant caveats. 
Whilst mergers in our sample are mostly concentrated in the South West, West, North 
East and North West, as shown in Figure 29, mergers between 2016 and 2017 occurred 
mostly in the South, East and North West, as shown in  
Figure 30. Furthermore, mergers which occurred in our sample are, on average, larger 
in terms of the merging colleges’ combined yearly income than mergers which occurred 
between 2016 and 2017, as shown in Figure 31. 
Both these findings imply caution must be exercised when extrapolating the findings of 
our report to mergers which occurred after 2015.  
Figure 29 Map of mergers from 2005 to 2015 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of Association of Colleges data. Mapping based on Local 
Education Authority boundaries. 
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Figure 30 Map of mergers from 2016 to 2017 
  
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of Association of Colleges data. Mapping based on Local 
Education Authority boundaries. 
Figure 31 Distribution of mergers by income size between sample period and 
2016-2017 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA college financial accounts data 
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ANNEX C DETAILED ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
Model specifications 
The model specifications which we used in our work are described below. 
In addition to assessing the impact of mergers on outcomes, we quantified the impact of 
mergers on the growth rates in outcomes. 
Specification 1 - Difference-in-differences 
The baseline model quantifies the effect of mergers compared to the sector average 
and controlling for college-specific and sector-wide trends. This is done by estimating 
a college-level fixed effects model which includes yearly categorical variables. 
In order to assess the impact of mergers on profitability, fixed cost synergies and debt 
burden, the same specification is run for five different financial variables:  
i. profitability; 
ii. staff costs as a percentage of income; 
iii. income per £ of fixed asset; 
iv. interest payments as a percentage of income; and, 
v. debt as a percentage of income 
To analyse non-financial performance, we consider success rates to be the primary 
variable of interest. We run our econometric model separately for 
i. Level 3 success rates; and 
ii. All success rates 
The equation estimated using OLS is specified below. This is done across all colleges 
(i) in the FE sector from years 2005 to 2015 (t): 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽postmerger𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
Postmerger is a variable equal to 1 if a college has been involved in a merger and 0 
otherwise, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 are college fixed effects and 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 are time fixed effects. Standard errors 
(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) are clustered at the college level. The estimated effect of a merger on a certain 
outcome variable, represented by 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, is represented by  𝛽𝛽. 
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To further understand the impact of mergers on college performance, we estimated the 
average college outcome in the three years immediately before and after the merger. 
This specification tested whether colleges which merge tend to display relatively poor 
performances prior to merging or vice versa. The use of this specification is 
complementary to the baseline difference-in-difference model because it can test for 
anticipatory effects. More specifically, it can estimate whether colleges experienced a 
significant deterioration in outcomes before a merger and were able to recover shortly 
after a merger. 
As for the baseline specification, this specification is also run for 14 different dependent 
variables (five measures of financial performance and two measures of non-financial 
performance, in levels and growth rates separately). 
 
Specification 2 – Fixed effects model with leads and lags 
In order to further understand the impact of mergers on college performance, we 
estimate the performance of merging colleges in the three years immediately before 
and after a merger. We estimate a fixed effects model with dummy variables for three 
leads and lags of the merger year on a restricted sample of only the colleges that 
merge.  
The choice of data selection is a key distinction compared to specification (1) which 
uses data on all colleges. The results of specification (2) compare the pre-and post-
merger outcomes for merging colleges, while controlling for college-specific effects 
and sector-wide effects observed among merged colleges only. 
The equation estimated using OLS is specified below. This is done across all 40 
colleges which underwent a merger in our sample (i) from years 2005 to 2015 (t): 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + � 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡merger𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑡𝑡=−3
+ 𝛽𝛽0merger𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡merger𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡3
𝑡𝑡=1
+ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
Merger is a variable equal to 1 if a college has undergone a merger in a specific year 
and 0 otherwise. We estimate 3 lags (𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡) and 3 leads (𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡) of the merger effect, 
estimating the yearly effect on the outcome up to 3 years before and after a merger. 
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 are college fixed effects and 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 are time fixed effects. Standard errors (𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) are 
clustered at the college level. The contemporaneous estimated effect of a merger on 
a certain outcome variable, represented by 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, is represented by  𝛽𝛽0. The average 
outcome variable 2 years before a merger is estimated by (𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−2) and the effect 2 
years after is estimated by (𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡+2), for example. 
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Results summary from specification 1 
Results from the difference-in-differences model across all colleges are presented 
below. The estimates of beta coefficient are reported, alongside their statistical 
significance, which correspond to the estimation of the merger effect. 
Table 12 Econometric results from baseline model  
Variable Estimated merger effect - on levels 
Estimated merger effect - on 
YoY growth 
Profit Margin -0.65% -0.29 p.p. 
Staff cost (as a % of 
income) 0.10% -0.31 p.p. 
Income per £ of fixed 
assets £0.01 -£0.06 
Interest (as a % of 
income) 0.03% 0.06 p.p. 
Debt (as a % of 
income) 2.54% -0.47 p.p. 
Level 3 Success 
Rate 1.00% -1.15 p.p.* 
All Success Rate -0.67% 0.05 p.p. 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
Note: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10% 
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Results summary from specification 2 
Results of the fixed effects model with leads and lags of the merger year are presented 
below. This model aims to analyse the time profile of performance of merging colleges 
in the years before and after a merger. The model is run separately on the levels and 
growth rates for five different financial variables and two different success rate 
variables. 
Table 13 Fixed effects model with leads and lags - levels of financial variables 
Time 
before/after 
merger 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff cost 
(as a % of 
income) 
Income per 
£ of fixed 
assets 
Interest (as 
a % of 
income) 
Debt (as a 
% of 
income) 
T – 3 -0.4% -0.24% £0.06 -0.1% 0.4% 
T - 2 -1.1%** 0.22% -£0.03 -0.1% -1.4% 
T - 1 -0.6% 0.21% -£0.03 -0.2%* -0.1% 
T (merger 
year) -0.3% -0.48% -£0.05 -0.2% 2.1% 
T + 1 -0.6% -0.12% £0.01 -0.2% -2.3% 
T + 2 0.4% 0.62% £0.00 -0.3%* -4.0% 
T + 3 0.1% 0.85% -£0.02 -0.2% -1.5% 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
Note: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%  
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Table 14 Fixed effects model with leads and lags – growth rates of financial 
variables 
Time 
before/after 
merger 
YoY 
change - 
Profit 
Margin 
YoY change 
-    Staff 
cost (as a % 
of income) 
YoY 
change - 
Income per 
£ of fixed 
assets 
YoY 
change - 
Interest (as 
a % of 
income) 
YoY 
change -    
Debt (as a 
% of 
income) 
T - 3 0.3% 1.16% -£0.04 0.0% 2.7% 
T - 2 -0.7% 0.80% -£0.08 0.0% -1.4% 
T - 1 0.8% 0.15% -£0.00 -0.1% 2.8% 
T (merger 
year) 0.5% -0.43% -£0.02 0.1% 2.1% 
T + 1 -0.1% 0.54% £0.06 -0.1% -4.3%** 
T + 2 0.0% 1.5%* -£0.02 -0.1%** -0.5% 
T + 3 -1.0% 0.06% £0.00 0.0% 1.1% 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA College Accounts 
Note: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%  
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Table 15 Fixed effects model with leads and lags - levels of success rate variables 
Time before/after merger Level 3 Success Rate Success Rate – All courses 
T – 3 1.6%* -0.4% 
T - 2 0.7% -0.6% 
T - 1 1.5% 0.1% 
T (merger year) 0.1% 0.5% 
T + 1 0.1% -0.3% 
T + 2 1.7%** 0.7% 
T + 3 0.2% 0.3% 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of National Achievement tables 
Note: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%  
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Table 16 Fixed effects model with leads and lags – growth rates of success rate 
variables 
Time before/after 
merger 
Percentage point (p.p.) 
change - Level 3 Success 
Rate 
Percentage point (p.p.) 
change -    All Success Rate 
T - 3 1 p.p.* -0.7 p.p. 
T - 2 -1.1 p.p. -0.9 p.p. 
T - 1 1 p.p. 0.7 p.p. 
T (merger year) -1.4 p.p. 0.2 p.p. 
T + 1 0.2 p.p. -0.7 p.p. 
T + 2 1.9 p.p. 0.6 p.p. 
T + 3 -1.7 p.p.* -0.8 p.p. 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of National Achievement tables 
Note: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10% 
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ANNEX D DETAILED COMPARISON OF 
CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS COLLEGES 
Composite ranking based on key metrics 
A composite ranking of colleges is constructed based on profitability, fixed costs and 
debt in the following way: 
 
The method of ranking colleges by their composite score provides a balanced view of 
their financial performance across three key metrics – profitability, fixed costs and debt. 
College rankings by any one metric alone do not provide a comprehensive account of 
financial performance. Such rankings are also sensitive to the choice of financial metric. 
For instance, Brooklands College ranks 1 in profitability improvements but ranks 34 (out 
of 40 colleges) in debt reduction. 
The following sections provide details of the college performance (as indicated by the 
composite rankings) by various college characteristics. The ranking is sensitive to the 
time period considered, the financial metric chosen and the methodology used to 
calculate composite ranking. Given this limitation, it should be interpreted with due 
caution. 
Steps in calculating the composite rankings 
1. The change in average profitability, fixed costs and debt in the three years 
before and after a merger is calculated for each merged entity. 
2. Colleges are ranked by the magnitude of changes in profitability, fixed costs 
and debt – this creates three sets of rankings: 
I. By increase in profitability; 
II. By decrease in fixed costs; and 
III. By decrease in debt 
3. The rankings for these three metrics are combined to calculate a unique 
performance score (or composite score) for each college – this is done by 
taking a simple average of the three different rankings. For instance, if college 
x is ranked 6 on profitability, 11 on fixed costs and 13 on debt, its composite 
score would be 10. 
4. Colleges are ranked by their composite score to get the composite ranking. 
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Individual metric college rankings 
We report the top 5 and bottom 5 college for each individual metric below. The colleges 
which are reported as being highest ranked for increases in profitability do not always 
fully correspond to colleges being ranked highest for decreases to staff costs and debt 
as a percentage of income.  
These results highlight the variation within performance across the three individual 
metrics selected. For this reason, we have sought to combine the rankings of college 
across metrics, to give a more balanced picture of performance. 
Figure 32 Top and Bottom 5 ranking for profitability only 
College Name Profitability score rank 
Change in Profit Margin (3 
year after vs 3 years before) 
Top 5 Colleges 
LeSoCo 1 10% 
Brooklands College 2 9% 
Barnet and Southgate College 3 7% 
Derby College 4 6% 
Grimsby Institute of Further 
and Higher Education 5 4% 
Bottom 5 Colleges 
Guildford College 36 -6% 
NCG 37 -6% 
Heart of Worcestershire 
College 38 -6% 
Kirklees College 39 -8% 
K College (South and West 
Kent College) 40 -10% 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA college accounts AoC data 
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Figure 33 Top and Bottom 5 ranking for staff costs only 
College Name Staff cost score rank 
Change in Staff costs (as a % of 
income) (3 year after vs 3 years 
before) 
Top 5 Colleges 
Brooklands College 1 -12% 
The College of Haringey, 
Enfield and North East 
London 
2 -10% 
Barnet and Southgate College 3 -10% 
Sparsholt College 4 -7% 
London South East Colleges 
(LSEC) 5 -7% 
Bottom 5 Colleges 
Stockport College 36 6% 
Bath College 37 7% 
Stockton Riverside College 38 7% 
LeSoCo 39 10% 
Lincoln College 40 12% 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA college accounts and AoC data 
Figure 34 Top and Bottom 5 ranking for debt burden only 
College Name Debt burden score rank 
Change in debt (as a % of 
income) (3 year after vs 3 
years before) 
Top 5 Colleges 
South and City College 
Birmingham 1 -13% 
NCG 2 -10% 
South Essex College of 
Further and Higher Education 3 -9% 
Salford City College 4 -4% 
South Staffordshire College 5 -4% 
Bottom 5 Colleges 
Kirklees College 36 25% 
Colchester Institute 37 28% 
Central Sussex College 38 37% 
Barnet and Southgate College 39 38% 
K College (South and West 
Kent College) 40 71% 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA college accounts and AoC data 
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Comparison of college performance by characteristics 
Relative size of colleges undergoing a merger 
Mergers are categorised by the relative sizes of merging colleges pre-merger. This is 
done by creating college size categories (Small, Medium and Large) using a college’s 
position in the distribution of FE college income. A college with income in the lowest 
quartile is defined as small, and large if its yearly income is in the highest quartile, with 
the remaining colleges being classed as medium. 
Figure 35 Average college rank by relative size of merger (lower is better) 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA college accounts and AoC data 
 
The following broad trends emerge: 
• Most mergers in our sample are between a small college and a large college 
(depicted by the category “Small-Large” in the chart): 21 out of 40 mergers in our 
dataset are instances of a large college merging with a small one. We do not 
observe any mergers between two small colleges or between two large colleges. 
• Financial performance does not vary substantially by size of merging colleges:  
The average composite ranking across sizes categories is similar across all 
merger combination types. 
Note that the sample sizes for many categories are small and these results should be 
interpreted with caution. 
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Rurality of college location 
We have used data from the Get Information about Schools14 database to identify the 
geographic setting of a college. The data relies on the location of the head office of the 
merged college, as is reported in the database. The classification of urban and rural is 
reported at the Output Area level15. 
As shown in Figure 36, most mergers in our sample are between colleges in urban 
areas. Only 2 out of 40 college mergers in the sample took place in rural hamlets or 
isolated dwellings. The small sample of rural mergers doesn’t allow for comparison of 
performance against urban mergers. On average rural mergers have a composite 
ranking of 6 which appears to be substantially better than the average ranking of 16 
across the three ‘urban’ categories – however, this result may be driven by the small 
sample size, so caution must be exerted when comparing mergers in urban and rural 
settings. 
Figure 36 Average college rank by rurality of location (lower is better) 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA college accounts and AoC data 
                                            
 
14 https://get-information-schools.service.gov.uk/ 
15 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/methodology/geography/geographicalproducts/ruralurbanclassifications/2001rural
urbanclassification/ruralurbandefinitionenglandandwales 
65 
 
Region of merger 
We have used data from the Get Information about Schools16 database to identify the 
region of a college. The data relies on the location of the school’s head office, as is 
reported in the database. 
Figure 37 Average college rank by merger region (lower is better) 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA college accounts and AoC data 
Figure 37 shows the average college post-merger performance rank by region. Given 
the sample sizes for these categories are small, with on average only 5 colleges per 
region, the results should be interpreted with caution. The following patterns emerge 
from the data on composite rankings: 
• There is variation across average post-merger performance for mergers in our 
sample – the best performing region, the East Midlands, has an average 
composite ranking of 13 whereas the average rank in the worst performing 
region, the North East, is 30. 
• The East Midlands, London and the North West are the three regions with the 
best (lowest) composite ranking: relative to others, mergers in these regions 
have had marginally higher increases in financial performance 3 years after 
merging (compared to 3 years before). 
                                            
 
16 https://get-information-schools.service.gov.uk/ 
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There is substantial variation across the financial metrics which make up the composite 
average. Figure 38 provides a comparison of each component used to calculate the 
college rank by region. 
Figure 38 Average college rank by merger region split into various ranking 
subcomponents (lower is better) 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA college accounts and AoC data 
We observe the following patterns: 
• Mergers in the East Midlands had the best relative performance on profitability 
improvements. 
• London mergers had the best relative performance on staff cost reductions. 
• Mergers in the North West had relatively good performance on profitability and 
average performance on staff costs and debt reduction. 
It is important to note that more research is required to robustly conclude that merger 
effects vary by region. These results are sensitive to the time period considered, the 
financial metric chosen and the methodology used to calculate the composite ranking. 
Pre-merger trends in performance 
A college’s post-merger performance might be influenced by the degree of pre-merger 
underperformance. This may be the case for rescue mergers, whereby the combination 
of a high-performing large college with an underperforming one hinders the post-merger 
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performance of the joint college. We test whether poor financial performance in the pre-
merger period is associated with lower performance in the post-merger period. 
As shown by Figure 39, there is very little difference in the pre-merger performance of 
the five best and five worst colleges, in terms of their post-merger improvement. This 
suggests that pre-merger profitability is not a strong predictor of post-merger 
performance. 
Figure 39 Average 3-year change in pre-merger profitability for top 5 and bottom 5 
colleges, ranked according to overall composite ranking 
 
Source: Frontier Economics analysis of ESFA college accounts and AoC data 
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ANNEX E INDIVIDUAL COLLEGE FINANCIAL 
VARIABLES 
The following tables detail the financial outcome variables used in our econometric 
models. For each college in our sample, we report the average variables from the years 
2003/2004 (classified as 2004) to 2016/2017 (classified as 2017), averaging across all 
colleges which underwent a merger: 
• Operating profit margin (as a % of yearly college income) 
• Staff costs (as a % of yearly college income) 
• College annual income per £ of fixed assets 
• Interest payments (as a % of yearly college income) 
• Debt payments (as a % of yearly college income) 
We report the name of the merged entity, as reported in the 2015/2016 financial year 
college accounts data. This is because all values reported are a combination of the 
colleges which underwent a merger, even in the pre-merger period. The years which 
particular college merge can be found in Annex A. 
Yearly data has been included for all colleges which underwent a merger during the 
relevant period of analysis. Data on college performance in the post-merger period was 
taken directly from the ESFA accounts. Data on individual colleges was combined in the 
pre-merger period to make it comparable to the merged college in the post-merger 
period. ESFA account data was used to aggregate the outcome variables using the 
methodology as reported in the main body. 
There are a number of missing values, which are reported as blank cells in the tables 
below, due to the following reasons: 
• College fixed asset data is only reported in the ESFA college accounts from 
2005/2006 onwards, implying the calculation of income per pound of fixed assets 
can only be done starting from then. 
• Certain colleges are missing financial data, as their data is not present in the 
yearly ESFA financial accounts. An example of this is Brooklands College, which 
is missing data in 2008/2009. 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Barnet and 
Southgate 
College 
2004 -2% 61%   0% 0% 
Barnet and 
Southgate 
College 
2005 -1% 65%   1% 5% 
Barnet and 
Southgate 
College 
2006 0% 67% £0.92 0% 5% 
Barnet and 
Southgate 
College 
2007 -2% 70% £0.93 0% 7% 
Barnet and 
Southgate 
College 
2008 -5% 66% £1.04 0% 7% 
Barnet and 
Southgate 
College 
2009 -9% 68% £0.71 1% -29% 
Barnet and 
Southgate 
College 
2010 -5% 64% £0.61 1% 42% 
Barnet and 
Southgate 
College 
2011 1% 60% £0.57 2% 44% 
Barnet and 
Southgate 
College 
2012 2% 56% £0.69 2% 46% 
Barnet and 
Southgate 
College 
2013 -1% 54% £0.60 3% 44% 
Barnet and 
Southgate 
College 
2014 2% 58% £0.74 3% 43% 
Barnet and 
Southgate 
College 
2015 -2% 59% £0.68 3% 42% 
Barnet and 
Southgate 
College 
2016 4% 59% £0.56 3% 43% 
Barnet and 
Southgate 
College 
2017 0% 60% £0.54 3% 43% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Brooklands 
College 2004 -2% 68%   0% 0% 
Brooklands 
College 2005 -4% 67%   0% 0% 
Brooklands 
College 2006 -8% 76% £1.14 0% 1% 
Brooklands 
College 2007 -4% 68% £0.96 0% 22% 
Brooklands 
College 2008 -6% 62% £1.02 1% 21% 
Brooklands 
College 2009           
Brooklands 
College 2010 14% 55% £1.37 1% 19% 
Brooklands 
College 2011 0% 67% £1.00 1% 26% 
Brooklands 
College 2012 0% 63% £1.02 1% 25% 
Brooklands 
College 2013 0% 60% £1.10 1% 23% 
Brooklands 
College 2014 -1% 56% £1.22 1% 20% 
Brooklands 
College 2015 29% 50% £1.30 1% 18% 
Brooklands 
College 2016 1% 47% £0.81 1% 18% 
Brooklands 
College 2017 0% 41% £0.87 2% 16% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Bromley 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2004 4% 66%   0% 0% 
Bromley 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2005 2% 68%   0% 2% 
Bromley 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2006 -2% 71% £1.58 0% 2% 
Bromley 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2007 1% 71% £1.41 0% 11% 
Bromley 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2008 -1% 71% £1.28 1% 15% 
Bromley 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2009 -2% 70% £0.99 1% 17% 
Bromley 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2010 -4% 73% £0.79 0% 17% 
Bromley 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2011 1% 69% £0.82 0% 14% 
Bromley 
College of 
Further and 
2012 4% 66% £0.70 0% 14% 
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Higher 
Education 
Bromley 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2013 1% 64% £0.66 0% 15% 
Bromley 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2014 -2% 65% £0.57 0% 26% 
Bromley 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2015 2% 72% £0.54 0% 18% 
Bromley 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2016 -8% 68% £0.52 0% 22% 
Bromley 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2017 -2% 67% £0.51 2% 22% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per  
£ fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
The College 
of Haringey, 
Enfield and 
North East 
London 
2004 -4% 63%   0% 0% 
The College 
of Haringey, 
Enfield and 
North East 
London 
2005 -1% 65%   0% 5% 
The College 
of Haringey, 
Enfield and 
North East 
London 
2006 0% 69% £0.89 0% 5% 
The College 
of Haringey, 
Enfield and 
North East 
London 
2007 2% 68% £0.91 0% 4% 
The College 
of Haringey, 
Enfield and 
North East 
London 
2008 5% 63% £0.96 0% 4% 
The College 
of Haringey, 
Enfield and 
North East 
London 
2009 1% 59% £1.14 0% 3% 
The College 
of Haringey, 
Enfield and 
North East 
London 
2010 5% 57% £1.13 0% 2% 
The College 
of Haringey, 
Enfield and 
North East 
London 
2011 2% 59% £1.10 0% 2% 
The College 
of Haringey, 
Enfield and 
2012 4% 51% £1.00 0% 2% 
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North East 
London 
The College 
of Haringey, 
Enfield and 
North East 
London 
2013 1% 54% £0.89 0% 2% 
The College 
of Haringey, 
Enfield and 
North East 
London 
2014 0% 59% £0.79 0% 2% 
The College 
of Haringey, 
Enfield and 
North East 
London 
2015 2% 56% £0.69 0% 1% 
The College 
of Haringey, 
Enfield and 
North East 
London 
2016 4% 58% £0.47 0% 2% 
The College 
of Haringey, 
Enfield and 
North East 
London 
2017 3% 58% £0.52 0% 2% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Colchester 
Institute 2004 -6% 65%   0% 0% 
Colchester 
Institute 2005 1% 64%   0% 0% 
Colchester 
Institute 2006 2% 64% £0.92 0% 0% 
Colchester 
Institute 2007 1% 65% £0.94 0% 1% 
Colchester 
Institute 2008 -2% 68% £0.78 0% 12% 
Colchester 
Institute 2009 -29% 68% £0.70 0% 46% 
Colchester 
Institute 2010 2% 65% £0.69 0% 42% 
Colchester 
Institute 2011 -1% 67% £0.71 2% 38% 
Colchester 
Institute 2012 -1% 68% £0.68 2% 35% 
Colchester 
Institute 2013 -5% 70% £0.71 2% 31% 
Colchester 
Institute 2014 -2% 61% £0.75 2% 29% 
Colchester 
Institute 2015 3% 65% £0.65 2% 30% 
Colchester 
Institute 2016 -7% 73% £0.58 2% 34% 
Colchester 
Institute 2017 2% 69% £0.56 2% 32% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Cornwall 
College 
Group 
2004 1% 64%   0% 0% 
Cornwall 
College 
Group 
2005 2% 67%   1% 19% 
Cornwall 
College 
Group 
2006 0% 68% £0.94 1% 19% 
Cornwall 
College 
Group 
2007 1% 68% £0.88 1% 21% 
Cornwall 
College 
Group 
2008 0% 71% £0.89 1% 19% 
Cornwall 
College 
Group 
2009 -3% 71% £0.90 1% 20% 
Cornwall 
College 
Group 
2010 2% 65% £1.01 1% 19% 
Cornwall 
College 
Group 
2011 4% 62% £0.98 1% 21% 
Cornwall 
College 
Group 
2012 3% 67% £0.90 1% 22% 
Cornwall 
College 
Group 
2013 -2% 70% £0.83 1% 25% 
Cornwall 
College 
Group 
2014 -2% 69% £0.77 1% 27% 
Cornwall 
College 
Group 
2015 -14% 75% £0.69 1% 26% 
Cornwall 
College 
Group 
2016 -6% 72% £0.69 1% 25% 
Cornwall 
College 
Group 
2017 -1% 64% £0.70 1% 24% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Central 
Sussex 
College 
2004 -1% 68%   0% 0% 
Central 
Sussex 
College 
2005 0% 67%   1% 22% 
Central 
Sussex 
College 
2006 0% 69% £0.82 1% 23% 
Central 
Sussex 
College 
2007 1% 70% £0.68 2% 42% 
Central 
Sussex 
College 
2008 2% 69% £0.65 1% 46% 
Central 
Sussex 
College 
2009 -13% 72% £0.67 2% 56% 
Central 
Sussex 
College 
2010 13% 65% £0.74 2% 43% 
Central 
Sussex 
College 
2011 0% 70% £0.74 2% 44% 
Central 
Sussex 
College 
2012 -1% 72% £0.60 3% 71% 
Central 
Sussex 
College 
2013 -36% 93% £0.49 4% 132% 
Central 
Sussex 
College 
2014 -4% 67% £0.50 5% 133% 
Central 
Sussex 
College 
2015 5% 63% £0.52 4% 128% 
Central 
Sussex 
College 
2016 -68% 73% £0.52 5% 166% 
Central 
Sussex 
College 
2017 0% 70% £0.82 13% 191% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff costs 
(as a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments (as 
a % of 
income) 
Debt (as a 
% of 
income) 
Bath 
College 2004 0% 68%   0% 0% 
Bath 
College 2005 -5% 70%   1% 12% 
Bath 
College 2006 -3% 71% £0.87 1% 12% 
Bath 
College 2007 5% 64% £0.88 1% 12% 
Bath 
College 2008 -2% 67% £0.89 1% 14% 
Bath 
College 2009 0% 64% £0.97 0% 13% 
Bath 
College 2010 -2% 66% £0.96 1% 13% 
Bath 
College 2011 -1% 64% £0.95 1% 17% 
Bath 
College 2012 -2% 62% £0.84 1% 19% 
Bath 
College 2013 -6% 64% £0.78 1% 19% 
Bath 
College 2014 0% 63% £0.79 1% 25% 
Bath 
College 2015 1% 66% £0.59 1% 30% 
Bath 
College 2016 -4% 65% £0.69 1% 27% 
Bath 
College 2017 -13% 75% £0.63 1% 20% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Manchester 
College 2004 0% 69%   0% 0% 
Manchester 
College 2005 2% 69%   0% 7% 
Manchester 
College 2006 2% 72% £1.31 0% 13% 
Manchester 
College 2007 3% 72% £1.63 1% 10% 
Manchester 
College 2008 2% 69% £0.98 1% 23% 
Manchester 
College 2009 -2% 74% £1.84 1% 9% 
Manchester 
College 2010 1% 78% £1.67 0% 10% 
Manchester 
College 2011 4% 73% £1.49 0% 13% 
Manchester 
College 2012 3% 71% £1.56 0% 11% 
Manchester 
College 2013 3% 72% £1.33 0% 20% 
Manchester 
College 2014 2% 72% £1.32 1% 19% 
Manchester 
College 2015 0% 73% £1.40 1% 17% 
Manchester 
College 2016 0% 71% £1.58 1% 14% 
Manchester 
College 2017 2% 70% £1.57 1% 13% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff costs 
(as a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as a 
% of 
income) 
Derby 
College 2004 -4% 67%   0% 0% 
Derby 
College 2005 -4% 68%   1% 21% 
Derby 
College 2006 -1% 66% £1.24 1% 9% 
Derby 
College 2007 1% 69% £1.33 0% 6% 
Derby 
College 2008 1% 69% £0.78 0% 3% 
Derby 
College 2009 -18% 68% £0.70 0% 16% 
Derby 
College 2010 -3% 64% £0.63 0% 23% 
Derby 
College 2011 -2% 66% £0.65 0% 13% 
Derby 
College 2012 8% 64% £0.65 0% 18% 
Derby 
College 2013 -4% 59% £0.61 0% 30% 
Derby 
College 2014 6% 57% £0.57 0% 24% 
Derby 
College 2015 5% 63% £0.56 0% 23% 
Derby 
College 2016 -7% 67% £0.50 0% 13% 
Derby 
College 2017 0% 66% £0.52 0% 12% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Easton 
and Otley 
College 
2004 4% 57%   0% 0% 
Easton 
and Otley 
College 
2005 4% 56%   0% 0% 
Easton 
and Otley 
College 
2006 6% 58% £0.86 0% 10% 
Easton 
and Otley 
College 
2007 1% 64% £0.80 1% 17% 
Easton 
and Otley 
College 
2008 6% 56% £0.92 1% 12% 
Easton 
and Otley 
College 
2009 6% 55% £0.74 1% 28% 
Easton 
and Otley 
College 
2010 3% 59% £0.61 2% 27% 
Easton 
and Otley 
College 
2011 5% 57% £0.62 1% 26% 
Easton 
and Otley 
College 
2012 4% 57% £0.65 1% 25% 
Easton 
and Otley 
College 
2013 0% 60% £0.61 1% 25% 
Easton 
and Otley 
College 
2014 -5% 66% £0.58 1% 25% 
Easton 
and Otley 
College 
2015 1% 62% £0.55 1% 25% 
Easton 
and Otley 
College 
2016 -10% 66% £0.53 1% 25% 
Easton 
and Otley 
College 
2017 -1% 71% £0.55 1% 23% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Gloucestershire 
College 2004 4% 62%   0% 0% 
Gloucestershire 
College 2005 8% 62%   0% 0% 
Gloucestershire 
College 2006 4% 65% £0.78 0% 0% 
Gloucestershire 
College 2007 3% 67% £0.55 0% 1% 
Gloucestershire 
College 2008 1% 68% £0.59 0% 0% 
Gloucestershire 
College 2009 -3% 70% £0.56 0% 0% 
Gloucestershire 
College 2010 7% 62% £0.60 0% 0% 
Gloucestershire 
College 2011 10% 61% £0.62 0% 21% 
Gloucestershire 
College 2012 9% 60% £0.66 0% 19% 
Gloucestershire 
College 2013 0% 67% £0.64 0% 18% 
Gloucestershire 
College 2014 -9% 73% £0.62 0% 18% 
Gloucestershire 
College 2015 3% 66% £0.64 1% 16% 
Gloucestershire 
College 2016 -5% 73% £0.64 2% 7% 
Gloucestershire 
College 2017 -1% 78% £0.66 2% 7% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Grimsby 
Institute of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2004 0% 63%   0% 0% 
Grimsby 
Institute of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2005 0% 64%   0% 10% 
Grimsby 
Institute of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2006 5% 60% £1.62 0% 8% 
Grimsby 
Institute of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2007 3% 60% £1.57 1% 6% 
Grimsby 
Institute of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2008 4% 59% £1.74 0% 5% 
Grimsby 
Institute of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2009 -3% 62% £1.81 1% 4% 
Grimsby 
Institute of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2010 -1% 61% £1.18 1% 4% 
Grimsby 
Institute of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2011 6% 60% £0.97 1% 1% 
Grimsby 
Institute of 
Further and 
2012 7% 53% £1.00 0% 15% 
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Higher 
Education 
Grimsby 
Institute of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2013 3% 57% £0.91 1% 14% 
Grimsby 
Institute of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2014 2% 59% £0.78 1% 15% 
Grimsby 
Institute of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2015 4% 58% £0.79 1% 14% 
Grimsby 
Institute of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2016 -3% 64% £0.70 1% 15% 
Grimsby 
Institute of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2017 -4% 68% £0.60 1% 15% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Guildford 
College 2004 1% 59%   0% 0% 
Guildford 
College 2005 1% 61%   0% 0% 
Guildford 
College 2006 2% 61% £1.59 0% 0% 
Guildford 
College 2007 -4% 65% £1.56 0% 0% 
Guildford 
College 2008 -5% 67% £1.59 0% 0% 
Guildford 
College 2009 -10% 72% £1.59 0% 0% 
Guildford 
College 2010 0% 59% £1.88 0% 0% 
Guildford 
College 2011 3% 60% £1.73 0% 0% 
Guildford 
College 2012 2% 57% £1.64 0% 0% 
Guildford 
College 2013 -5% 62% £1.55 0% 0% 
Guildford 
College 2014 -18% 66% £1.47 0% 0% 
Guildford 
College 2015 6% 58% £1.28 0% 12% 
Guildford 
College 2016 -1% 63% £1.13 0% 3% 
Guildford 
College 2017 -5% 70% £1.06 0% 0% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Riverside 
College 
Halton 
2004 -1% 67%   0% 0% 
Riverside 
College 
Halton 
2005 -1% 69%   1% 21% 
Riverside 
College 
Halton 
2006 -2% 63% £0.98 1% 22% 
Riverside 
College 
Halton 
2007 4% 63% £1.07 1% 16% 
Riverside 
College 
Halton 
2008 3% 67% £1.04 1% 14% 
Riverside 
College 
Halton 
2009 -4% 71% £0.97 1% 13% 
Riverside 
College 
Halton 
2010 6% 65% £0.98 1% 18% 
Riverside 
College 
Halton 
2011 -1% 74% £0.89 1% 21% 
Riverside 
College 
Halton 
2012 1% 64% £0.94 1% 19% 
Riverside 
College 
Halton 
2013 1% 64% £1.01 1% 14% 
Riverside 
College 
Halton 
2014 1% 62% £1.00 1% 20% 
Riverside 
College 
Halton 
2015 1% 58% £1.16 1% 19% 
Riverside 
College 
Halton 
2016 3% 56% £1.24 1% 20% 
Riverside 
College 
Halton 
2017 0% 61% £1.18 1% 17% 
 
87 
 
Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Herefordshire 
and Ludlow 
College 
2004 -3% 67%   0% 0% 
Herefordshire 
and Ludlow 
College 
2005 -3% 63%   0% 0% 
Herefordshire 
and Ludlow 
College 
2006 0% 61% £1.79 0% 1% 
Herefordshire 
and Ludlow 
College 
2007 15% 58% £1.04 0% 1% 
Herefordshire 
and Ludlow 
College 
2008 4% 65% £0.60 0% 0% 
Herefordshire 
and Ludlow 
College 
2009 3% 60% £0.56 0% 1% 
Herefordshire 
and Ludlow 
College 
2010 -4% 71% £0.48 0% 11% 
Herefordshire 
and Ludlow 
College 
2011 1% 67% £0.47 0% 8% 
Herefordshire 
and Ludlow 
College 
2012 7% 61% £0.47 0% 8% 
Herefordshire 
and Ludlow 
College 
2013 -3% 66% £0.49 0% 7% 
Herefordshire 
and Ludlow 
College 
2014 0% 65% £0.52 0% 7% 
Herefordshire 
and Ludlow 
College 
2015 2% 65% £0.43 0% 7% 
Herefordshire 
and Ludlow 
College 
2016 -3% 65% £0.47 0% 6% 
Herefordshire 
and Ludlow 
College 
2017 2% 65% £0.55 0% 5% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff costs 
(as a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as a 
% of 
income) 
Kirklees 
College 2004 -4% 62%   0% 0% 
Kirklees 
College 2005 0% 62%   0% 4% 
Kirklees 
College 2006 -1% 64% £1.21 0% 3% 
Kirklees 
College 2007 -1% 65% £1.13 0% 2% 
Kirklees 
College 2008 5% 56% £1.31 0% 2% 
Kirklees 
College 2009 -5% 64% £1.15 0% 1% 
Kirklees 
College 2010 -26% 68% £1.06 1% 48% 
Kirklees 
College 2011 -12% 74% £0.57 3% 54% 
Kirklees 
College 2012 1% 62% £0.44 3% 64% 
Kirklees 
College 2013 -6% 66% £0.39 3% 73% 
Kirklees 
College 2014 0% 64% £0.33 3% 64% 
Kirklees 
College 2015 2% 65% £0.33 3% 68% 
Kirklees 
College 2016 -14% 63% £0.36 3% 58% 
Kirklees 
College 2017 -26% 68% £0.40 3% 53% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff costs 
(as a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as a 
% of 
income) 
Leeds 
City 
College 
2004 0% 66%   0% 0% 
Leeds 
City 
College 
2005 1% 67%   0% 10% 
Leeds 
City 
College 
2006 0% 67% £1.85 0% 8% 
Leeds 
City 
College 
2007 1% 66% £2.11 0% 7% 
Leeds 
City 
College 
2008 1% 66% £2.01 0% 7% 
Leeds 
City 
College 
2009 -8% 65% £1.44 0% 7% 
Leeds 
City 
College 
2010 -4% 69% £1.25 0% 10% 
Leeds 
City 
College 
2011 0% 67% £1.19 0% 11% 
Leeds 
City 
College 
2012 -2% 64% £1.11 0% 15% 
Leeds 
City 
College 
2013 -3% 64% £0.90 1% 37% 
Leeds 
City 
College 
2014 0% 65% £0.85 2% 38% 
Leeds 
City 
College 
2015 -1% 68% £0.75 2% 39% 
Leeds 
City 
College 
2016 -3% 66% £0.68 2% 41% 
Leeds 
City 
College 
2017 25% 66% £0.61 2% 37% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff costs 
(as a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments (as 
a % of 
income) 
Debt (as a 
% of 
income) 
LeSoCo 2004 0% 66%   0% 0% 
LeSoCo 2005 0% 69%   0% 6% 
LeSoCo 2006 0% 70% £1.55 0% 5% 
LeSoCo 2007 4% 68% £1.62 0% 0% 
LeSoCo 2008 -9% 68% £2.19 0% 0% 
LeSoCo 2009 -3% 68% £1.89 0% 1% 
LeSoCo 2010 -8% 76% £1.65 0% 4% 
LeSoCo 2011 -3% 73% £1.54 0% 0% 
LeSoCo 2012 0% 67% £1.79 0% 0% 
LeSoCo 2013 -8% 82% £1.26 0% 0% 
LeSoCo 2014 -43% 80% £1.29 0% 0% 
LeSoCo 2015 18% 82% £0.89 0% 0% 
LeSoCo 2016 0% 72% £0.59 0% 4% 
LeSoCo 2017 -15% 74% £0.50 0% 0% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
College 
of West 
Anglia 
2004 4% 60%   0% 0% 
College 
of West 
Anglia 
2005 3% 61%   0% 3% 
College 
of West 
Anglia 
2006 -2% 67% £1.00 0% 1% 
College 
of West 
Anglia 
2007 8% 59% £1.47 0% 1% 
College 
of West 
Anglia 
2008 2% 62% £1.21 0% 0% 
College 
of West 
Anglia 
2009 -25% 68% £1.55 0% 0% 
College 
of West 
Anglia 
2010 2% 61% £1.70 0% 0% 
College 
of West 
Anglia 
2011 0% 58% £1.71 0% 0% 
College 
of West 
Anglia 
2012 -20% 67% £1.25 0% 0% 
College 
of West 
Anglia 
2013 4% 61% £0.86 0% 26% 
College 
of West 
Anglia 
2014 2% 62% £0.81 1% 25% 
College 
of West 
Anglia 
2015 4% 62% £0.73 1% 22% 
College 
of West 
Anglia 
2016 -2% 61% £0.57 1% 22% 
College 
of West 
Anglia 
2017 0% 65% £0.58 1% 19% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff costs 
(as a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as a 
% of 
income) 
Lincoln 
College 2004 4% 46%   0% 0% 
Lincoln 
College 2005 1% 65%   0% 0% 
Lincoln 
College 2006 8% 63% £1.01 0% 0% 
Lincoln 
College 2007 9% 65% £0.85 0% 0% 
Lincoln 
College 2008 8% 65% £0.86 0% 0% 
Lincoln 
College 2009 5% 71% £0.88 0% 0% 
Lincoln 
College 2010 1% 74% £1.04 0% 0% 
Lincoln 
College 2011 0% 74% £1.03 0% 0% 
Lincoln 
College 2012 2% 69% £0.94 0% 0% 
Lincoln 
College 2013 -2% 66% £0.80 0% 12% 
Lincoln 
College 2014 -1% 62% £0.73 0% 15% 
Lincoln 
College 2015 -15% 67% £0.68 1% 44% 
Lincoln 
College 2016 -14% 66% £0.73 1% 46% 
Lincoln 
College 2017 8% 61% £1.08 1% 32% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff costs 
(as a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments (as 
a % of 
income) 
Debt (as a 
% of 
income) 
Petroc 2004 4% 61%   0% 0% 
Petroc 2005 1% 66%   1% 10% 
Petroc 2006 -3% 71% £1.11 1% 15% 
Petroc 2007 0% 68% £1.20 1% 17% 
Petroc 2008 1% 66% £1.48 0% 12% 
Petroc 2009 -7% 65% £1.54 1% 14% 
Petroc 2010 -2% 67% £1.55 1% 22% 
Petroc 2011 -2% 69% £1.47 1% 22% 
Petroc 2012 1% 63% £1.47 1% 22% 
Petroc 2013 -1% 59% £1.41 1% 19% 
Petroc 2014 -2% 58% £1.31 1% 17% 
Petroc 2015 -1% 58% £1.10 1% 16% 
Petroc 2016 -2% 68% £0.70 1% 18% 
Petroc 2017 1% 71% £0.71 1% 16% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Newcastle 
College 2004 5% 59%   0% 0% 
Newcastle 
College 2005 10% 57%   0% 4% 
Newcastle 
College 2006 7% 62% £0.75 0% 7% 
Newcastle 
College 2007 7% 60% £0.94 0% 6% 
Newcastle 
College 2008 4% 60% £1.02 0% 15% 
Newcastle 
College 2009 0% 58% £1.38 1% 10% 
Newcastle 
College 2010 4% 55% £1.24 1% 11% 
Newcastle 
College 2011 4% 51% £1.11 1% 34% 
Newcastle 
College 2012 4% 51% £0.95 1% 30% 
Newcastle 
College 2013 4% 50% £1.06 0% 20% 
Newcastle 
College 2014 3% 51% £1.05 0% 12% 
Newcastle 
College 2015 0% 54% £0.91 0% 12% 
Newcastle 
College 2016 -23% 62% £0.85 1% 19% 
Newcastle 
College 2017 -4% 56% £0.71 1% 23% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff costs 
(as a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Salford 
City 
College 
2004 23% 66%   0% 0% 
Salford 
City 
College 
2005 0% 68%   0% 8% 
Salford 
City 
College 
2006 -1% 70% £1.29 0% 10% 
Salford 
City 
College 
2007 2% 68% £1.11 1% 25% 
Salford 
City 
College 
2008 2% 67% £1.21 1% 22% 
Salford 
City 
College 
2009 -1% 67% £1.02 2% 24% 
Salford 
City 
College 
2010 4% 66% £1.42 1% 16% 
Salford 
City 
College 
2011 6% 65% £1.51 1% 15% 
Salford 
City 
College 
2012 5% 62% £1.50 1% 14% 
Salford 
City 
College 
2013 3% 64% £1.29 1% 12% 
Salford 
City 
College 
2014 -4% 70% £1.16 1% 15% 
Salford 
City 
College 
2015 1% 63% £1.07 1% 19% 
Salford 
City 
College 
2016 1% 62% £0.95 1% 21% 
Salford 
City 
College 
2017 3% 59% £0.86 1% 20% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2004 10% 58%   0% 0% 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2005 -1% 52%   1% 25% 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2006 1% 55% £0.61 1% 24% 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2007 -1% 67% £0.53 2% 28% 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2008 6% 61% £0.61 1% 23% 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2009 0% 62% £0.62 2% 20% 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2010 -6% 66% £0.63 1% 19% 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2011 1% 63% £0.71 1% 16% 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
2012 2% 58% £0.66 1% 14% 
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Higher 
Education 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2013 26% 53% £0.68 1% 27% 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2014 1% 54% £0.47 1% 73% 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2015 -1% 49% £0.52 1% 51% 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2016 -5% 52% £0.49 1% 44% 
South Essex 
College of 
Further and 
Higher 
Education 
2017 -1% 56% £0.46 1% 46% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
South and 
City College 
Birmingham 
2004 -1% 66%   0% 0% 
South and 
City College 
Birmingham 
2005 -4% 68%   1% 34% 
South and 
City College 
Birmingham 
2006 0% 64% £0.92 2% 31% 
South and 
City College 
Birmingham 
2007 1% 69% £0.66 3% 55% 
South and 
City College 
Birmingham 
2008 0% 71% £0.72 2% 40% 
South and 
City College 
Birmingham 
2009 1% 67% £0.71 1% 45% 
South and 
City College 
Birmingham 
2010 -7% 74% £0.68 1% 48% 
South and 
City College 
Birmingham 
2011 3% 69% £0.67 1% 49% 
South and 
City College 
Birmingham 
2012 3% 66% £0.71 1% 45% 
South and 
City College 
Birmingham 
2013 2% 64% £0.78 2% 34% 
South and 
City College 
Birmingham 
2014 1% 71% £0.72 2% 34% 
South and 
City College 
Birmingham 
2015 -15% 79% £0.74 2% 34% 
South and 
City College 
Birmingham 
2016 -3% 70% £0.71 2% 35% 
South and 
City College 
Birmingham 
2017 -1% 72% £0.70 2% 34% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
South 
Nottingham 
College 
2004 1% 62%   0% 0% 
South 
Nottingham 
College 
2005 -3% 68%   0% 6% 
South 
Nottingham 
College 
2006 8% 62% £0.98 1% 15% 
South 
Nottingham 
College 
2007 1% 66% £1.13 1% 11% 
South 
Nottingham 
College 
2008 2% 67% £0.81 1% 47% 
South 
Nottingham 
College 
2009 -1% 48% £1.26 1% 32% 
South 
Nottingham 
College 
2010 -9% 61% £1.04 1% 35% 
South 
Nottingham 
College 
2011 1% 56% £1.01 1% 37% 
South 
Nottingham 
College 
2012 -2% 51% £1.07 1% 39% 
South 
Nottingham 
College 
2013 5% 54% £1.11 1% 31% 
South 
Nottingham 
College 
2014 -6% 55% £1.00 1% 35% 
South 
Nottingham 
College 
2015 -2% 51% £0.98 1% 38% 
South 
Nottingham 
College 
2016 -3% 55% £1.00 1% 31% 
South 
Nottingham 
College 
2017           
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff costs 
(as a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as a 
% of 
income) 
Trafford 
College 2004 -1% 69%   0% 0% 
Trafford 
College 2005 1% 70%   1% 9% 
Trafford 
College 2006 0% 72% £1.28 0% 10% 
Trafford 
College 2007 -5% 73% £1.38 0% 12% 
Trafford 
College 2008 3% 69% £1.34 1% 12% 
Trafford 
College 2009 -5% 73% £1.02 0% 17% 
Trafford 
College 2010 11% 63% £0.75 0% 32% 
Trafford 
College 2011 3% 69% £0.68 1% 39% 
Trafford 
College 2012 -1% 64% £0.67 2% 40% 
Trafford 
College 2013 26% 64% £0.59 2% 33% 
Trafford 
College 2014 -3% 68% £0.52 2% 30% 
Trafford 
College 2015 -5% 72% £0.50 2% 32% 
Trafford 
College 2016 -2% 66% £0.49 2% 33% 
Trafford 
College 2017 -4% 69% £0.51 2% 32% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Sparsholt 
College 2004 5% 56%   0% 0% 
Sparsholt 
College 2005 0% 61%   2% 25% 
Sparsholt 
College 2006 2% 61% £0.61 1% 19% 
Sparsholt 
College 2007 3% 59% £0.58 1% 17% 
Sparsholt 
College 2008 2% 54% £0.64 1% 13% 
Sparsholt 
College 2009 -1% 55% £0.61 1% 11% 
Sparsholt 
College 2010 3% 47% £0.70 1% 9% 
Sparsholt 
College 2011 -3% 55% £0.62 1% 22% 
Sparsholt 
College 2012 1% 57% £0.59 1% 22% 
Sparsholt 
College 2013 0% 55% £0.56 1% 20% 
Sparsholt 
College 2014 -2% 56% £0.49 1% 26% 
Sparsholt 
College 2015 -2% 58% £0.46 1% 26% 
Sparsholt 
College 2016 4% 54% £0.44 1% 27% 
Sparsholt 
College 2017 3% 55% £0.47 1% 23% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Stockport 
College 2004 2% 67%   0% 0% 
Stockport 
College 2005 1% 71%   0% 0% 
Stockport 
College 2006 -3% 74% £1.03 0% 0% 
Stockport 
College 2007 -1% 77% £1.03 0% 3% 
Stockport 
College 2008 -1% 74% £0.99 0% 8% 
Stockport 
College 2009 -2% 74% £0.63 1% 36% 
Stockport 
College 2010 -15% 81% £0.53 0% 48% 
Stockport 
College 2011 -13% 78% £0.57 1% 59% 
Stockport 
College 2012 2% 63% £0.71 3% 55% 
Stockport 
College 2013 -5% 69% £0.64 4% 49% 
Stockport 
College 2014 -15% 71% £0.58 3% 47% 
Stockport 
College 2015 -27% 76% £0.49 4% 77% 
Stockport 
College 2016 -104% 72% £0.70 6% 110% 
Stockport 
College 2017 -28% 79% £0.66 5% 116% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
South 
Thames 
College 
2004 4% 60%   0% 0% 
South 
Thames 
College 
2005 2% 62%   0% 1% 
South 
Thames 
College 
2006 1% 65% £1.17 0% 13% 
South 
Thames 
College 
2007 0% 68% £0.81 1% 26% 
South 
Thames 
College 
2008 3% 65% £0.53 1% 33% 
South 
Thames 
College 
2009 -2% 65% £0.42 3% 85% 
South 
Thames 
College 
2010 1% 63% £0.36 3% 45% 
South 
Thames 
College 
2011 1% 64% £0.34 2% 45% 
South 
Thames 
College 
2012 2% 62% £0.34 2% 44% 
South 
Thames 
College 
2013 -1% 66% £0.29 2% 41% 
South 
Thames 
College 
2014 -2% 65% £0.29 2% 40% 
South 
Thames 
College 
2015 -12% 71% £0.27 2% 42% 
South 
Thames 
College 
2016 38% 70% £0.24 2% 45% 
South 
Thames 
College 
2017 -12% 71% £0.25 2% 30% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 
2004 4% 60%   0% 0% 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 
2005 1% 61%   2% 25% 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 
2006 -1% 64% £0.85 2% 32% 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 
2007 2% 65% £0.87 2% 33% 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 
2008 3% 64% £0.81 2% 29% 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 
2009 -9% 70% £0.44 2% 58% 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 
2010 1% 67% £0.45 2% 33% 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 
2011 -1% 74% £0.42 2% 35% 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 
2012 -1% 72% £0.40 2% 37% 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 
2013 -2% 70% £0.40 2% 46% 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 
2014 1% 68% £0.39 2% 40% 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 
2015 7% 63% £0.42 2% 37% 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 
2016 3% 67% £0.51 3% 34% 
Stockton 
Riverside 
College 
2017 2% 71% £0.50 3% 35% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
South 
Gloucestershire 
and Stroud 
College 
2004 5% 63%   0% 0% 
South 
Gloucestershire 
and Stroud 
College 
2005 6% 64%   1% 39% 
South 
Gloucestershire 
and Stroud 
College 
2006 2% 65% £0.70 2% 28% 
South 
Gloucestershire 
and Stroud 
College 
2007 2% 66% £0.64 2% 32% 
South 
Gloucestershire 
and Stroud 
College 
2008 3% 65% £0.72 1% 31% 
South 
Gloucestershire 
and Stroud 
College 
2009 -1% 68% £0.74 1% 28% 
South 
Gloucestershire 
and Stroud 
College 
2010 3% 63% £0.76 1% 27% 
South 
Gloucestershire 
and Stroud 
College 
2011 3% 64% £0.77 1% 27% 
South 
Gloucestershire 
and Stroud 
College 
2012 -4% 69% £0.79 1% 27% 
South 
Gloucestershire 
and Stroud 
College 
2013 -1% 66% £0.81 1% 25% 
South 
Gloucestershire 
and Stroud 
College 
2014 2% 65% £0.71 1% 24% 
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South 
Gloucestershire 
and Stroud 
College 
2015 -1% 69% £0.69 1% 35% 
South 
Gloucestershire 
and Stroud 
College 
2016 0% 66% £0.59 2% 34% 
South 
Gloucestershire 
and Stroud 
College 
2017 2% 66% £0.64 1% 30% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Sutton 
Coldfield 
College 
2004 20% 65%   0% 0% 
Sutton 
Coldfield 
College 
2005 0% 66%   0% 4% 
Sutton 
Coldfield 
College 
2006 3% 64% £0.91 0% 8% 
Sutton 
Coldfield 
College 
2007 8% 63% £1.02 0% 6% 
Sutton 
Coldfield 
College 
2008 4% 61% £1.06 0% 5% 
Sutton 
Coldfield 
College 
2009 -1% 62% £1.08 0% 5% 
Sutton 
Coldfield 
College 
2010 3% 59% £1.11 0% 5% 
Sutton 
Coldfield 
College 
2011 2% 55% £0.99 0% 13% 
Sutton 
Coldfield 
College 
2012 1% 58% £0.89 1% 13% 
Sutton 
Coldfield 
College 
2013 1% 61% £0.64 0% 16% 
Sutton 
Coldfield 
College 
2014 0% 61% £0.70 1% 14% 
Sutton 
Coldfield 
College 
2015 -25% 76% £0.61 1% 23% 
Sutton 
Coldfield 
College 
2016 -5% 61% £0.52 1% 42% 
Sutton 
Coldfield 
College 
2017 -1% 63% £0.56 1% 39% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
South 
Staffordshire 
College 
2004 2% 67%   0% 0% 
South 
Staffordshire 
College 
2005 0% 67%   1% 14% 
South 
Staffordshire 
College 
2006 1% 67% £0.91 1% 22% 
South 
Staffordshire 
College 
2007 6% 62% £0.89 1% 24% 
South 
Staffordshire 
College 
2008 4% 61% £0.99 1% 21% 
South 
Staffordshire 
College 
2009 -1% 61% £1.09 1% 19% 
South 
Staffordshire 
College 
2010 4% 59% £1.11 1% 18% 
South 
Staffordshire 
College 
2011 3% 61% £1.03 1% 17% 
South 
Staffordshire 
College 
2012 2% 63% £0.84 1% 19% 
South 
Staffordshire 
College 
2013 -5% 69% £0.75 1% 26% 
South 
Staffordshire 
College 
2014 0% 68% £0.65 2% 27% 
South 
Staffordshire 
College 
2015 -6% 72% £0.60 2% 26% 
South 
Staffordshire 
College 
2016 0% 67% £0.58 2% 26% 
South 
Staffordshire 
College 
2017 -22% 70% £0.66 2% 27% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Truro and 
Penwith 
College 
2004 9% 64%   0% 0% 
Truro and 
Penwith 
College 
2005 16% 59%   0% 0% 
Truro and 
Penwith 
College 
2006 10% 61% £0.72 0% 0% 
Truro and 
Penwith 
College 
2007 11% 60% £0.81 0% 0% 
Truro and 
Penwith 
College 
2008 19% 58% £0.78 0% 0% 
Truro and 
Penwith 
College 
2009 12% 63% £0.63 0% 0% 
Truro and 
Penwith 
College 
2010 13% 61% £0.56 0% 0% 
Truro and 
Penwith 
College 
2011 15% 62% £0.52 0% 0% 
Truro and 
Penwith 
College 
2012 12% 64% £0.48 0% 0% 
Truro and 
Penwith 
College 
2013 7% 66% £0.41 0% 0% 
Truro and 
Penwith 
College 
2014 2% 69% £0.39 0% 0% 
Truro and 
Penwith 
College 
2015 2% 68% £0.45 0% 0% 
Truro and 
Penwith 
College 
2016 -3% 71% £0.43 0% 0% 
Truro and 
Penwith 
College 
2017 2% 72% £0.37 0% 0% 
 
110 
 
Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Tyne 
Metropolitan 
College 
2004 -1% 66%   0% 0% 
Tyne 
Metropolitan 
College 
2005 -1% 67%   0% 3% 
Tyne 
Metropolitan 
College 
2006 -1% 66% £0.87 0% 6% 
Tyne 
Metropolitan 
College 
2007 -3% 69% £0.83 0% 9% 
Tyne 
Metropolitan 
College 
2008 0% 69% £0.64 1% 10% 
Tyne 
Metropolitan 
College 
2009 -18% 70% £0.57 1% 9% 
Tyne 
Metropolitan 
College 
2010 1% 62% £0.56 0% 8% 
Tyne 
Metropolitan 
College 
2011 4% 60% £0.53 0% 21% 
Tyne 
Metropolitan 
College 
2012 0% 62% £0.45 1% 22% 
Tyne 
Metropolitan 
College 
2013 -1% 63% £0.48 1% 18% 
Tyne 
Metropolitan 
College 
2014 2% 63% £0.43 0% 15% 
Tyne 
Metropolitan 
College 
2015 1% 69% £0.69 0% 14% 
Tyne 
Metropolitan 
College 
2016 -1% 64% £0.75 0% 11% 
Tyne 
Metropolitan 
College 
2017 31% 47%   0% 6% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 
2004 5% 62%   0% 0% 
K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 
2005 2% 66%   1% 10% 
K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 
2006 -5% 69% £1.07 1% 10% 
K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 
2007 -2% 67% £1.01 0% 9% 
K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 
2008 -7% 68% £0.97 0% 19% 
K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 
2009 -3% 70% £0.50 0% 107% 
K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 
2010 -5% 70% £0.30 1% 147% 
K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 
2011 -14% 70% £0.35 0% 116% 
K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 
2012 -44% 82% £0.31 5% 102% 
K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 
2013 -29% 78% £0.29 3% 90% 
K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 
2014 20% 33% £0.67 1% 22% 
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K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 
2015 4% 58% £0.25 3% 48% 
K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 
2016 0% 64% £0.23 4% 48% 
K College 
(South and 
West Kent 
College) 
2017           
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Wiltshire 
College 2004 2% 65%   0% 0% 
Wiltshire 
College 2005 1% 66%   1% 13% 
Wiltshire 
College 2006 0% 68% £1.08 1% 12% 
Wiltshire 
College 2007 0% 69% £1.07 1% 12% 
Wiltshire 
College 2008 11% 63% £1.08 1% 18% 
Wiltshire 
College 2009 -7% 67% £1.09 1% 19% 
Wiltshire 
College 2010 -3% 69% £1.10 1% 21% 
Wiltshire 
College 2011 -2% 67% £1.11 1% 20% 
Wiltshire 
College 2012 1% 62% £1.12 1% 19% 
Wiltshire 
College 2013 2% 61% £1.02 1% 20% 
Wiltshire 
College 2014 0% 59% £0.98 1% 19% 
Wiltshire 
College 2015 -8% 66% £0.65 1% 27% 
Wiltshire 
College 2016 -5% 70% £0.59 2% 34% 
Wiltshire 
College 2017 -1% 67% £0.62 1% 32% 
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Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
Margin 
Staff 
costs (as 
a % of 
income) 
Income 
per £ 
fixed 
asset 
Interest 
payments 
(as a % of 
income) 
Debt (as 
a % of 
income) 
Heart of 
Worcestershire 
College 
2004 4% 62%   0% 0% 
Heart of 
Worcestershire 
College 
2005 2% 65%   1% 18% 
Heart of 
Worcestershire 
College 
2006 2% 63% £0.97 1% 14% 
Heart of 
Worcestershire 
College 
2007 2% 63% £0.94 1% 16% 
Heart of 
Worcestershire 
College 
2008 3% 63% £1.02 1% 12% 
Heart of 
Worcestershire 
College 
2009 0% 62% £1.15 1% 10% 
Heart of 
Worcestershire 
College 
2010 -1% 62% £1.10 1% 13% 
Heart of 
Worcestershire 
College 
2011 1% 63% £1.05 1% 18% 
Heart of 
Worcestershire 
College 
2012 5% 56% £1.02 1% 15% 
Heart of 
Worcestershire 
College 
2013 2% 52% £0.97 0% 15% 
Heart of 
Worcestershire 
College 
2014 0% 54% £0.91 0% 15% 
Heart of 
Worcestershire 
College 
2015 -2% 57% £0.81 1% 16% 
Heart of 
Worcestershire 
College 
2016 -4% 56% £0.79 1% 16% 
Heart of 
Worcestershire 
College 
2017 -5% 59% £0.78 2% 10% 
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ANNEX F INDIVIDUAL COLLEGE SUCCESS RATES 
The following tables detail the success rate outcome variables used in our econometric 
models. For each college in our sample, we report the average variables from the years 
2004/2005 (classified as 2005) to 2014/2015 (classified as 2015), averaging across all 
colleges which underwent a merger: 
• Student success rates for level 3 courses only 
• Average student success rates across all courses offered by the FE college. 
We report the name of the merged entity, as reported in the 2015 financial year data. 
This is because all values reported are a combination of the colleges which underwent a 
merger, even in the pre-merger period. The years which particular college merge can be 
found in Annex A. 
Yearly data has been included for all colleges which underwent a merger during the 
relevant period of analysis. Data on college performance in the post-merger period was 
taken directly from the National Achievement Rate Tables (from 2013 onwards) and 
National Success Rate Tables (before 2013). Data on individual colleges was combined 
in the pre-merger period to make it comparable to the merged college in the post-
merger period. College success rates were calculated using an average in the pre-
merger period, weighted by the number of learners in each institution. 
There are a number of missing values, which are reported as either blank cells or as 
“N/A” in the tables below, due to the following reasons: 
• Blank cells are due to college level data missing from the national success rate 
tables. 
• We have undergone a manual exercise to match colleges in our merged sample 
with college success rate data. Colleges which report an N/A indicate we were 
unabe to find success rate data for a particular college. These colleges are: 
o  Bromley College of Further and Higher Education 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate - All 
Courses 
Barnet and Southgate 
College 2005 65% 67% 
Barnet and Southgate 
College 2006 63% 74% 
Barnet and Southgate 
College 2007 72% 75% 
Barnet and Southgate 
College 2008 75% 77% 
Barnet and Southgate 
College 2009 71% 75% 
Barnet and Southgate 
College 2010 72% 73% 
Barnet and Southgate 
College 2011 75% 79% 
Barnet and Southgate 
College 2012 77% 83% 
Barnet and Southgate 
College 2013 82% 84% 
Barnet and Southgate 
College 2014 84% 85% 
Barnet and Southgate 
College 2015 81% 83% 
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Name Year 
Success Rate - 
Level 3 
Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
Brooklands College 2005 59% 68% 
Brooklands College 2006 66% 72% 
Brooklands College 2007 61% 63% 
Brooklands College 2008 73% 72% 
Brooklands College 2009 68% 72% 
Brooklands College 2010 64% 67% 
Brooklands College 2011 71% 75% 
Brooklands College 2012 81% 84% 
Brooklands College 2013 81% 87% 
Brooklands College 2014 86% 86% 
Brooklands College 2015 86% 86% 
 
 
Name Year 
Success Rate - 
Level 3 
Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
Bromley College of Further and 
Higher Education 2005 N/A N/A 
Bromley College of Further and 
Higher Education 2006 N/A N/A 
Bromley College of Further and 
Higher Education 2007 N/A N/A 
Bromley College of Further and 
Higher Education 2008 N/A N/A 
Bromley College of Further and 
Higher Education 2009 N/A N/A 
Bromley College of Further and 
Higher Education 2010 N/A N/A 
Bromley College of Further and 
Higher Education 2011 N/A N/A 
Bromley College of Further and 
Higher Education 2012 N/A N/A 
Bromley College of Further and 
Higher Education 2013 N/A N/A 
Bromley College of Further and 
Higher Education 2014 N/A N/A 
Bromley College of Further and 
Higher Education 2015 N/A N/A 
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Name Year 
Success Rate - 
Level 3 
Courses 
Success 
Rate - All 
Courses 
The College of Haringey, Enfield and 
North East London 2005 61% 68% 
The College of Haringey, Enfield and 
North East London 2006 66% 81% 
The College of Haringey, Enfield and 
North East London 2007 72% 83% 
The College of Haringey, Enfield and 
North East London 2008 73% 83% 
The College of Haringey, Enfield and 
North East London 2009 74% 82% 
The College of Haringey, Enfield and 
North East London 2010 69% 74% 
The College of Haringey, Enfield and 
North East London 2011 80% 80% 
The College of Haringey, Enfield and 
North East London 2012 78% 85% 
The College of Haringey, Enfield and 
North East London 2013 83% 90% 
The College of Haringey, Enfield and 
North East London 2014 85% 89% 
The College of Haringey, Enfield and 
North East London 2015 77% 86% 
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Name Year 
Success Rate 
- Level 3 
Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
Colchester Institute 2005 60% 61% 
Colchester Institute 2006 65% 71% 
Colchester Institute 2007 72% 72% 
Colchester Institute 2008 76% 76% 
Colchester Institute 2009 77% 78% 
Colchester Institute 2010 75% 79% 
Colchester Institute 2011 75% 76% 
Colchester Institute 2012 75% 76% 
Colchester Institute 2013 81% 82% 
Colchester Institute 2014 84% 77% 
Colchester Institute 2015 85% 79% 
 
Name Year 
Success Rate 
- Level 3 
Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
Cornwall College Group 2005 69% 74% 
Cornwall College Group 2006 68% 79% 
Cornwall College Group 2007 70% 77% 
Cornwall College Group 2008 80% 82% 
Cornwall College Group 2009 81% 84% 
Cornwall College Group 2010 79% 82% 
Cornwall College Group 2011 81% 83% 
Cornwall College Group 2012 76% 82% 
Cornwall College Group 2013 81% 84% 
Cornwall College Group 2014 81% 79% 
Cornwall College Group 2015 80% 80% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Central Sussex College 2005 74% 61% 
Central Sussex College 2006 76% 74% 
Central Sussex College 2007 77% 78% 
Central Sussex College 2008 81% 79% 
Central Sussex College 2009 83% 80% 
Central Sussex College 2010 82% 81% 
Central Sussex College 2011 80% 79% 
Central Sussex College 2012 82% 82% 
Central Sussex College 2013 83% 83% 
Central Sussex College 2014 83% 80% 
Central Sussex College 2015 85% 82% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Bath College 2005 63% 62% 
Bath College 2006 68% 72% 
Bath College 2007 67% 71% 
Bath College 2008 73% 75% 
Bath College 2009 77% 74% 
Bath College 2010 71% 75% 
Bath College 2011 77% 79% 
Bath College 2012 79% 84% 
Bath College 2013 83% 83% 
Bath College 2014 86% 84% 
Bath College 2015 84% 79% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Manchester College 2005     
Manchester College 2006     
Manchester College 2007     
Manchester College 2008     
Manchester College 2009 66% 71% 
Manchester College 2010 67% 74% 
Manchester College 2011 73% 77% 
Manchester College 2012 78% 83% 
Manchester College 2013 81% 86% 
Manchester College 2014 81% 86% 
Manchester College 2015 80% 81% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Derby College 2005 64% 72% 
Derby College 2006 71% 82% 
Derby College 2007 79% 80% 
Derby College 2008 78% 80% 
Derby College 2009 79% 80% 
Derby College 2010 77% 78% 
Derby College 2011 76% 80% 
Derby College 2012 77% 80% 
Derby College 2013 82% 83% 
Derby College 2014 80% 82% 
Derby College 2015 86% 87% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Easton and Otley College 2005 60% 66% 
Easton and Otley College 2006 60% 76% 
Easton and Otley College 2007 65% 74% 
Easton and Otley College 2008 78% 80% 
Easton and Otley College 2009 81% 78% 
Easton and Otley College 2010 80% 77% 
Easton and Otley College 2011 77% 80% 
Easton and Otley College 2012 68% 81% 
Easton and Otley College 2013 81% 83% 
Easton and Otley College 2014 76% 74% 
Easton and Otley College 2015 68% 69% 
 
 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Gloucestershire College 2005 67% 73% 
Gloucestershire College 2006 65% 80% 
Gloucestershire College 2007 71% 74% 
Gloucestershire College 2008 78% 79% 
Gloucestershire College 2009 74% 75% 
Gloucestershire College 2010 72% 76% 
Gloucestershire College 2011 73% 79% 
Gloucestershire College 2012 79% 83% 
Gloucestershire College 2013 86% 90% 
Gloucestershire College 2014 84% 82% 
Gloucestershire College 2015 78% 79% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
Grimsby Institute of Further and 
Higher Education 2005 58% 72% 
Grimsby Institute of Further and 
Higher Education 2006 62% 72% 
Grimsby Institute of Further and 
Higher Education 2007 71% 77% 
Grimsby Institute of Further and 
Higher Education 2008 73% 79% 
Grimsby Institute of Further and 
Higher Education 2009 77% 79% 
Grimsby Institute of Further and 
Higher Education 2010 79% 81% 
Grimsby Institute of Further and 
Higher Education 2011 84% 85% 
Grimsby Institute of Further and 
Higher Education 2012 83% 85% 
Grimsby Institute of Further and 
Higher Education 2013 85% 88% 
Grimsby Institute of Further and 
Higher Education 2014 83% 86% 
Grimsby Institute of Further and 
Higher Education 2015 85% 86% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
Guildford College 2005 60% 67% 
Guildford College 2006 69% 79% 
Guildford College 2007 66% 72% 
Guildford College 2008 73% 76% 
Guildford College 2009 78% 78% 
Guildford College 2010 80% 79% 
Guildford College 2011 83% 83% 
Guildford College 2012 84% 84% 
Guildford College 2013 82% 85% 
Guildford College 2014 83% 78% 
Guildford College 2015 80% 81% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
Riverside College Halton 2005 65% 77% 
Riverside College Halton 2006 70% 76% 
Riverside College Halton 2007 68% 73% 
Riverside College Halton 2008 67% 74% 
Riverside College Halton 2009 73% 78% 
Riverside College Halton 2010 81% 81% 
Riverside College Halton 2011 79% 83% 
Riverside College Halton 2012 79% 85% 
Riverside College Halton 2013 85% 87% 
Riverside College Halton 2014 85% 81% 
Riverside College Halton 2015 85% 82% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
Herefordshire and Ludlow College 2005 73% 76% 
Herefordshire and Ludlow College 2006 75% 74% 
Herefordshire and Ludlow College 2007 77% 76% 
Herefordshire and Ludlow College 2008 80% 80% 
Herefordshire and Ludlow College 2009 80% 77% 
Herefordshire and Ludlow College 2010 81% 78% 
Herefordshire and Ludlow College 2011 82% 81% 
Herefordshire and Ludlow College 2012 83% 84% 
Herefordshire and Ludlow College 2013 87% 89% 
Herefordshire and Ludlow College 2014 75% 72% 
Herefordshire and Ludlow College 2015 87% 79% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
Kirklees College 2005 59% 68% 
Kirklees College 2006 65% 72% 
Kirklees College 2007 66% 71% 
Kirklees College 2008 69% 72% 
Kirklees College 2009 71% 71% 
Kirklees College 2010 71% 69% 
Kirklees College 2011 78% 82% 
Kirklees College 2012 83% 88% 
Kirklees College 2013 84% 89% 
Kirklees College 2014 90% 87% 
Kirklees College 2015 92% 82% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
Leeds City College 2005 67% 73% 
Leeds City College 2006 69% 73% 
Leeds City College 2007 73% 71% 
Leeds City College 2008 72% 73% 
Leeds City College 2009 76% 77% 
Leeds City College 2010 76% 81% 
Leeds City College 2011 74% 79% 
Leeds City College 2012 75% 83% 
Leeds City College 2013 72% 83% 
Leeds City College 2014 79% 80% 
Leeds City College 2015 81% 78% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
LeSoCo 2005 60% 71% 
LeSoCo 2006 62% 71% 
LeSoCo 2007 64% 75% 
LeSoCo 2008 70% 76% 
LeSoCo 2009 76% 76% 
LeSoCo 2010 77% 75% 
LeSoCo 2011 68% 72% 
LeSoCo 2012 65% 80% 
LeSoCo 2013 65% 83% 
LeSoCo 2014 80% 82% 
LeSoCo 2015 81% 81% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
College of West Anglia 2005 73% 81% 
College of West Anglia 2006 78% 80% 
College of West Anglia 2007 79% 81% 
College of West Anglia 2008 79% 81% 
College of West Anglia 2009 79% 82% 
College of West Anglia 2010 79% 78% 
College of West Anglia 2011 81% 82% 
College of West Anglia 2012 80% 88% 
College of West Anglia 2013 84% 87% 
College of West Anglia 2014 81% 84% 
College of West Anglia 2015 81% 80% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
Lincoln College 2005 67% 68% 
Lincoln College 2006 70% 70% 
Lincoln College 2007 66% 62% 
Lincoln College 2008 75% 73% 
Lincoln College 2009 75% 78% 
Lincoln College 2010 81% 83% 
Lincoln College 2011 82% 81% 
Lincoln College 2012 82% 80% 
Lincoln College 2013 81% 85% 
Lincoln College 2014 83% 81% 
Lincoln College 2015 82% 75% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
Petroc 2005 79% 68% 
Petroc 2006 77% 78% 
Petroc 2007 79% 79% 
Petroc 2008 80% 81% 
Petroc 2009 78% 77% 
Petroc 2010 78% 79% 
Petroc 2011 81% 82% 
Petroc 2012 80% 82% 
Petroc 2013 80% 86% 
Petroc 2014 89% 88% 
Petroc 2015 90% 88% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
Newcastle College 2005 66% 73% 
Newcastle College 2006 70% 78% 
Newcastle College 2007 73% 79% 
Newcastle College 2008 79% 81% 
Newcastle College 2009 77% 81% 
Newcastle College 2010 75% 83% 
Newcastle College 2011 77% 85% 
Newcastle College 2012 78% 84% 
Newcastle College 2013 81% 85% 
Newcastle College 2014 77% 77% 
Newcastle College 2015 76% 75% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate - 
All Courses 
Salford City College 2005 80% 79% 
Salford City College 2006 81% 82% 
Salford City College 2007 83% 82% 
Salford City College 2008 86% 84% 
Salford City College 2009 84% 81% 
Salford City College 2010 83% 76% 
Salford City College 2011 86% 88% 
Salford City College 2012 85% 89% 
Salford City College 2013 85% 88% 
Salford City College 2014 88% 84% 
Salford City College 2015 89% 88% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
South Essex College of Further and 
Higher Education 2005 60% 67% 
South Essex College of Further and 
Higher Education 2006 65% 72% 
South Essex College of Further and 
Higher Education 2007 72% 72% 
South Essex College of Further and 
Higher Education 2008 76% 76% 
South Essex College of Further and 
Higher Education 2009 78% 79% 
South Essex College of Further and 
Higher Education 2010 79% 81% 
South Essex College of Further and 
Higher Education 2011 73% 81% 
South Essex College of Further and 
Higher Education 2012 77% 79% 
South Essex College of Further and 
Higher Education 2013 80% 82% 
South Essex College of Further and 
Higher Education 2014 82% 79% 
South Essex College of Further and 
Higher Education 2015 83% 75% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
South and City College Birmingham 2005 62% 74% 
South and City College Birmingham 2006 64% 77% 
South and City College Birmingham 2007 70% 72% 
South and City College Birmingham 2008 75% 80% 
South and City College Birmingham 2009 79% 84% 
South and City College Birmingham 2010 78% 82% 
South and City College Birmingham 2011 81% 83% 
South and City College Birmingham 2012 78% 84% 
South and City College Birmingham 2013 79% 86% 
South and City College Birmingham 2014 84% 86% 
South and City College Birmingham 2015 82% 88% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
South Nottingham College 2005 60% 68% 
South Nottingham College 2006 63% 79% 
South Nottingham College 2007 75% 81% 
South Nottingham College 2008 81% 85% 
South Nottingham College 2009 81% 83% 
South Nottingham College 2010 80% 82% 
South Nottingham College 2011 75% 83% 
South Nottingham College 2012 71% 83% 
South Nottingham College 2013 79% 85% 
South Nottingham College 2014 79% 83% 
South Nottingham College 2015 84% 84% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Trafford College 2005 63% 71% 
Trafford College 2006 72% 73% 
Trafford College 2007 64% 70% 
Trafford College 2008 81% 81% 
Trafford College 2009 78% 78% 
Trafford College 2010 82% 78% 
Trafford College 2011 79% 83% 
Trafford College 2012 79% 83% 
Trafford College 2013 80% 85% 
Trafford College 2014 82% 86% 
Trafford College 2015 81% 84% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Sparsholt College 2005 59% 68% 
Sparsholt College 2006 61% 73% 
Sparsholt College 2007 45% 66% 
Sparsholt College 2008 79% 80% 
Sparsholt College 2009 79% 81% 
Sparsholt College 2010 77% 77% 
Sparsholt College 2011 80% 85% 
Sparsholt College 2012 85% 86% 
Sparsholt College 2013 85% 86% 
Sparsholt College 2014 86% 83% 
Sparsholt College 2015 86% 80% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Stockport College 2005 69% 63% 
Stockport College 2006 73% 74% 
Stockport College 2007 77% 78% 
Stockport College 2008 77% 80% 
Stockport College 2009 76% 79% 
Stockport College 2010 78% 82% 
Stockport College 2011 76% 81% 
Stockport College 2012 74% 81% 
Stockport College 2013 74% 77% 
Stockport College 2014 78% 79% 
Stockport College 2015 80% 77% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
South Thames College 2005 61% 71% 
South Thames College 2006 63% 71% 
South Thames College 2007 67% 74% 
South Thames College 2008 75% 78% 
South Thames College 2009 70% 78% 
South Thames College 2010 74% 80% 
South Thames College 2011 74% 79% 
South Thames College 2012 70% 78% 
South Thames College 2013 74% 83% 
South Thames College 2014 72% 82% 
South Thames College 2015 77% 82% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Stockton Riverside College 2005 63% 79% 
Stockton Riverside College 2006 72% 79% 
Stockton Riverside College 2007 72% 75% 
Stockton Riverside College 2008 76% 75% 
Stockton Riverside College 2009 81% 76% 
Stockton Riverside College 2010 82% 80% 
Stockton Riverside College 2011 84% 80% 
Stockton Riverside College 2012 83% 81% 
Stockton Riverside College 2013 84% 89% 
Stockton Riverside College 2014 87% 86% 
Stockton Riverside College 2015 86% 87% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
South Gloucestershire and Stroud 
College 2005 60% 71% 
South Gloucestershire and Stroud 
College 2006 65% 67% 
South Gloucestershire and Stroud 
College 2007 74% 79% 
South Gloucestershire and Stroud 
College 2008 75% 80% 
South Gloucestershire and Stroud 
College 2009 81% 80% 
South Gloucestershire and Stroud 
College 2010 80% 82% 
South Gloucestershire and Stroud 
College 2011 84% 89% 
South Gloucestershire and Stroud 
College 2012 83% 89% 
South Gloucestershire and Stroud 
College 2013     
South Gloucestershire and Stroud 
College 2014 84% 83% 
South Gloucestershire and Stroud 
College 2015 85% 79% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Sutton Coldfield College 2005 64% 65% 
Sutton Coldfield College 2006 70% 75% 
Sutton Coldfield College 2007 73% 76% 
Sutton Coldfield College 2008 75% 78% 
Sutton Coldfield College 2009 75% 77% 
Sutton Coldfield College 2010 76% 78% 
Sutton Coldfield College 2011 77% 79% 
Sutton Coldfield College 2012 81% 82% 
Sutton Coldfield College 2013 83% 87% 
Sutton Coldfield College 2014 83% 82% 
Sutton Coldfield College 2015 81% 81% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
South Staffordshire College 2005 52% 74% 
South Staffordshire College 2006 61% 74% 
South Staffordshire College 2007 67% 76% 
South Staffordshire College 2008 80% 83% 
South Staffordshire College 2009 69% 77% 
South Staffordshire College 2010 72% 81% 
South Staffordshire College 2011 70% 84% 
South Staffordshire College 2012 70% 88% 
South Staffordshire College 2013 76% 89% 
South Staffordshire College 2014 79% 80% 
South Staffordshire College 2015 79% 80% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Truro and Penwith College 2005 77% 78% 
Truro and Penwith College 2006 78% 84% 
Truro and Penwith College 2007 81% 81% 
Truro and Penwith College 2008 80% 84% 
Truro and Penwith College 2009 80% 82% 
Truro and Penwith College 2010 78% 81% 
Truro and Penwith College 2011 80% 81% 
Truro and Penwith College 2012 82% 82% 
Truro and Penwith College 2013 85% 86% 
Truro and Penwith College 2014 85% 82% 
Truro and Penwith College 2015 88% 84% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Tyne Metropolitan College 2005     
Tyne Metropolitan College 2006 63% 77% 
Tyne Metropolitan College 2007 67% 73% 
Tyne Metropolitan College 2008 66% 69% 
Tyne Metropolitan College 2009 73% 79% 
Tyne Metropolitan College 2010 73% 75% 
Tyne Metropolitan College 2011 79% 82% 
Tyne Metropolitan College 2012 80% 85% 
Tyne Metropolitan College 2013 85% 86% 
Tyne Metropolitan College 2014 83% 82% 
Tyne Metropolitan College 2015 84% 82% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
K College (South and West Kent 
College) 2005 65% 71% 
K College (South and West Kent 
College) 2006 68% 78% 
K College (South and West Kent 
College) 2007 70% 72% 
K College (South and West Kent 
College) 2008 72% 74% 
K College (South and West Kent 
College) 2009 76% 78% 
K College (South and West Kent 
College) 2010 77% 76% 
K College (South and West Kent 
College) 2011 75% 75% 
K College (South and West Kent 
College) 2012 76% 82% 
K College (South and West Kent 
College) 2013 77% 83% 
K College (South and West Kent 
College) 2014 78% 66% 
K College (South and West Kent 
College) 2015 79% 73% 
 
Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Wiltshire College 2005 61% 68% 
Wiltshire College 2006 64% 71% 
Wiltshire College 2007 68% 74% 
Wiltshire College 2008 75% 77% 
Wiltshire College 2009 81% 78% 
Wiltshire College 2010 79% 78% 
Wiltshire College 2011 74% 81% 
Wiltshire College 2012 75% 81% 
Wiltshire College 2013 77% 86% 
Wiltshire College 2014 82% 83% 
Wiltshire College 2015 87% 79% 
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Name Year Success Rate - Level 3 Courses 
Success Rate 
- All Courses 
Heart of Worcestershire College 2005 63% 77% 
Heart of Worcestershire College 2006 65% 83% 
Heart of Worcestershire College 2007 72% 83% 
Heart of Worcestershire College 2008 74% 85% 
Heart of Worcestershire College 2009 78% 82% 
Heart of Worcestershire College 2010 71% 77% 
Heart of Worcestershire College 2011 70% 76% 
Heart of Worcestershire College 2012 73% 82% 
Heart of Worcestershire College 2013 80% 86% 
Heart of Worcestershire College 2014 83% 82% 
Heart of Worcestershire College 2015 83% 77% 
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